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	<title>Comments on: Private Information and Long-Term Care Insurance</title>
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	<link>http://healthcare-economist.com/2006/06/15/private-information-and-long-term-care-insurance/</link>
	<description>An unbiased look at today's health care issues</description>
	<pubDate>Tue, 06 Jan 2009 11:28:26 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: Healthcare Economist &#183; Insurance Markets and Advantageous Selection</title>
		<link>http://healthcare-economist.com/2006/06/15/private-information-and-long-term-care-insurance/comment-page-1/#comment-131650</link>
		<dc:creator>Healthcare Economist &#183; Insurance Markets and Advantageous Selection</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 30 Jan 2008 17:38:41 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>[...] An NBER working paper by Cutler, Finkelstein and McGarry (2008) claims that preference heterogeneity may explain this phenomenon. If low-risk individuals also have a stronger risk aversion preferences, than they may buy more insurance than a high-risk individual who has risk loving preferences. This work is an extension of the Finkelstein and McGarry (AER 2006) article discussed in one of my earlier blog posts. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] An NBER working paper by Cutler, Finkelstein and McGarry (2008) claims that preference heterogeneity may explain this phenomenon. If low-risk individuals also have a stronger risk aversion preferences, than they may buy more insurance than a high-risk individual who has risk loving preferences. This work is an extension of the Finkelstein and McGarry (AER 2006) article discussed in one of my earlier blog posts. [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Arizona Insurance Agent</title>
		<link>http://healthcare-economist.com/2006/06/15/private-information-and-long-term-care-insurance/comment-page-1/#comment-55663</link>
		<dc:creator>Arizona Insurance Agent</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Jun 2007 06:02:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://healthcare-economist.com/2006/06/15/private-information-and-long-term-care-insurance/#comment-55663</guid>
		<description>When the baby boomer retirement kicks in the government better be prepared. I don't think enough of our population is buying LTC insurance. That leaves them using their own assets  and them relying upon the govt.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When the baby boomer retirement kicks in the government better be prepared. I don&#8217;t think enough of our population is buying LTC insurance. That leaves them using their own assets  and them relying upon the govt.</p>
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		<title>By: Healthcare Economist &#183; PacAdvantage: Adverse Selection Death Spiral</title>
		<link>http://healthcare-economist.com/2006/06/15/private-information-and-long-term-care-insurance/comment-page-1/#comment-422</link>
		<dc:creator>Healthcare Economist &#183; PacAdvantage: Adverse Selection Death Spiral</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 17 Aug 2006 17:54:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://healthcare-economist.com/2006/06/15/private-information-and-long-term-care-insurance/#comment-422</guid>
		<description>[...] In my June 15th post, I mentioned Cutler and Zeckhauser&#8217;s 1997 paper which discussed this concept of an adverse selection death spiral in the context of Harvard&#8217;s employee health insurance plans.  [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] In my June 15th post, I mentioned Cutler and Zeckhauser&#8217;s 1997 paper which discussed this concept of an adverse selection death spiral in the context of Harvard&#8217;s employee health insurance plans.  [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Healthcare Economist &#183; Amy Finkelstein in BusinessWeek</title>
		<link>http://healthcare-economist.com/2006/06/15/private-information-and-long-term-care-insurance/comment-page-1/#comment-408</link>
		<dc:creator>Healthcare Economist &#183; Amy Finkelstein in BusinessWeek</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 08 Aug 2006 18:24:59 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>[...] Amy Finkelstein is one of my favorite healthcare economists and recently BusinessWeek ran an article (&#8221;So that&#8217;s why it&#8217;s so expensive&#8220;) profiling her and her work.  I have profiled Ms. Finkelstein before in my June 15th post describing her 2005 paper with McGarry.  She also has a new NBER working paper (&#8221;The aggregate effects of health insurance: Evidence from the introduction of Medicare&#8220;), which is very interesting.  Here&#8217;s the abstract: This paper investigates the effects of market-wide changes in health insurance by examining the single largest change in health insurance coverage in American history: the introduction of Medicare in 1965. I estimate that the impact of Medicare on hospital spending is over six times larger than what the evidence from individual-level changes in health insurance would have predicted. This disproportionately larger effect may arise if market-wide changes in demand alter the incentives of hospitals to incur the fixed costs of entering the market or of adopting new practice styles. I present some evidence of these types of effects. A back of the envelope calculation based on the estimated impact of Medicare suggests that the overall spread of health insurance between 1950 and 1990 may be able to explain about half of the increase in real per capita health spending over this time period.   [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Amy Finkelstein is one of my favorite healthcare economists and recently BusinessWeek ran an article (&#8221;So that&#8217;s why it&#8217;s so expensive&#8220;) profiling her and her work.  I have profiled Ms. Finkelstein before in my June 15th post describing her 2005 paper with McGarry.  She also has a new NBER working paper (&#8221;The aggregate effects of health insurance: Evidence from the introduction of Medicare&#8220;), which is very interesting.  Here&#8217;s the abstract: This paper investigates the effects of market-wide changes in health insurance by examining the single largest change in health insurance coverage in American history: the introduction of Medicare in 1965. I estimate that the impact of Medicare on hospital spending is over six times larger than what the evidence from individual-level changes in health insurance would have predicted. This disproportionately larger effect may arise if market-wide changes in demand alter the incentives of hospitals to incur the fixed costs of entering the market or of adopting new practice styles. I present some evidence of these types of effects. A back of the envelope calculation based on the estimated impact of Medicare suggests that the overall spread of health insurance between 1950 and 1990 may be able to explain about half of the increase in real per capita health spending over this time period.   [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Med Market News &#187; Blog Archive &#187; Health Econ 101</title>
		<link>http://healthcare-economist.com/2006/06/15/private-information-and-long-term-care-insurance/comment-page-1/#comment-208</link>
		<dc:creator>Med Market News &#187; Blog Archive &#187; Health Econ 101</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 16 Jun 2006 18:34:39 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://healthcare-economist.com/2006/06/15/private-information-and-long-term-care-insurance/#comment-208</guid>
		<description>[...] Healthcare Economist takes a look at &#8216;adverse selection&#8217; and &#8216;moral hazard&#8217; in insurance markets. [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] Healthcare Economist takes a look at &#8216;adverse selection&#8217; and &#8216;moral hazard&#8217; in insurance markets. [...]</p>
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