February 2007

You are currently browsing the monthly archive for February 2007.

The Century Foundation has a very interesting debate on health care reform (transcript). Below I have cited some of the more interesting points.

  • ERISA. Jacob Hacker, professor of political science at Yale, claims that states attempts at health care reform may be limited by the Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974. According to Wikipedia, “ERISA Section 514 preempts all state laws that ‘relate to any employee benefit plan,’ with certain enumerated exceptions.”
  • Will providing universal health care attract low-income individuals are be a boon to a state’s economy? According to Jonathan Cohn, editor of the New Republic, “When it comes to, say, welfare, states that make their benefits generous run the risk of becoming a magnet for low-income residents, who (in theory) end up draining state coffers. But establishing statewide universal health care could (again, in theory) have all sorts of salutary economic effects. If a scheme actually eases the burden on business, for instance, it could attract more employers, create more jobs, and create a virtuous cycle of growth.
  • Is employer-provided insurance a good thing? The general consensus of the debate was that the U.S. should abandon employer provided insurance in the long-run; most Westernized countries in Europe (with the exception of Germany) do not base health insurance around the employer. Some of the forum participants worried about an adequate risk-pooling substitute if universal coverage was not implemented. Ezra Klein of The American Prospect proposed a community rating scheme. He also stated that “There’s no more unjust, inefficient, absurd, or perverse feature to our system than its tie to employment.” On the other hand, Jonathan Oberlander of the UNC department of Medicine stated “To paraphrase Churchill, employer-based insurance is the worst option for providing health insurance, except for all the others.”
  • Cost containment. Henry Aaron of the Brookings Institute claimed that “Universal coverage is a precondition for cost control, not the other way around. Only if all people are covered can regulatory measures exercise effective leverage on providers to hold down spending without creating intolerable incentives to deny care to weak payers—that is, the uninsured.” While universal coverage can reduce cost using a single payer system, it generally does so by restricting consumer choice and stymieing medical innovation. Pursuing a solitary goal of cost containment will not maximize society’s welfare in my opinion.
  • Health Care ceilings and floors. Should all individuals receive a minimum health care level (a floor)? Should individuals be able to purchase more comprehensive insurance than is offered by a government’s universal health care plan? Requiring catastrophic health insurance may induce poor individuals to avoid precautionary health services and thus may be more expensive in the long run. On the other hand, having insurance pay for all health costs creates a serious moral hazard problem. Ezra Klein wisely states: “In my ideal world, a national health service would cover basic services and private insurance—subsidized for those who need it—would cover above the limit. Like in France, a high floor and no ceiling is the way to go (by contrast, America has neither ceiling nor floor, and Canada has a high floor and low ceiling).”
  • Innovation. One problem with a single payer system is that it will stymie innovation. For instance, Leif Wellington Haase at the Century Foundation asserts, “In theory, private plans ought to have more flexibility to introduce new benefits, coordinate care, measure results, keep down costs, and promote information technology. The managed care ‘revolution’ of the 1990s produced some examples. Kaiser Permanente, the giant California-based HMO, is light years ahead in introducing practical uses of information technology and care coordination. In other countries, the existence of private insurance is a valuable safety valve for people who want to buy upâ€? from the government’s universal coverage plan. But most efforts by private insurers seem long on public relations and short on reality. The Veteran’s Administration and, increasingly, Medicare have been taking the lead on quality and care coordination.”

Cavalcade of Risk #20 is posted at Renthusiast.

Bodies

While I was in New York I saw the Bodies exhibition.  The exhibition gives a complete tour of the human anatomy using real human specimens.  While most information provided in the exhibit could be found in an anatomy textbook, it is very revealing to see how the body operates first-hand.  The exhibit not only looks entire human specimens but also displays a variety of human organs and body parts as well as entire systems (circulatory, digestive, etc.).  Normal and abnormal body parts are compared side by side.  For individuals (like myself) who have not attended medical school, the exhibit is illuminating.

You can not learn how to play baseball, by simply reading a book; you need to practice.  Similarly, reading a basic anatomy book is helpful to understanding the human body, but examining real human specimens gives a person further insight into the body’s amazing inner-workings which work to keep each of us alive.  I highly recommend the exhibit.

The Eastern Economic Association (EEA) Conference I attended last weekend was a great experience. Economists from institutions across the nation attended and I was able to interact with a number of prominent economists. Below I will summarize a few of more interesting papers which I personally saw presented at the conference. To view an abstract of the paper which I presented at the EEA conference, click here.

  • Soma Bhattacharya, “The value of mortality risk reductions in Delhi, India.” Ms. Bhattacharya examined how much commuters in Delhi were willing to pay (WTP) to reduce the odds of being involved in a traffic fatality. Commuters included those who arrive at work by: car, bike/motorbike, or walking. The safety reductions were examined in three contexts: 1) the WTP for a bicycle helmet, 2) the WTP for the construction of a pedestrian subway, and 3) the WTP to move to a city with a lower probability of a traffic fatality.  Using these WTP figures, the author finds that the value of a statistical life (VSL) in Dehli is about $150,000 PPP$. This figure can now be used by Indian policy-makers when conducting cost-benefit analyses for road safety projects.
  • Fred Foldvary, “Circumventing California’s Proposition 13 for the Public Collection of Rent.” In his presentation, Mr. Foldvary examines how municipalities are able to get around Proposition 13‘s restriction that property tax rates cannot increase and property value assessments will not change until a person sells one’s house. Some of the ways municipalities circumvent this constitutional amendment are: impact fees/developer fees, user fees, tax increment financing for land deemed to be blighted, civic partnerships and others. Foldvary believes that decentralizing government financing and allowing municipalities more freedom to tax and spend as they choose is a superior form of governing to centralized rules such as Prop 13.
  • Bo-Hyun ChoImmunization as Intertemporal Investment or Resource Allocation: Dynamic Decision-Making Model of Immunization.” Mr. Cho employs an overlapping generations model (OLG) and applies it to the context of immunization.  In this theoretical model, immunization is seen as an investment in health, but the decision to immunize is based on the individual’s future expected prevalence of the disease. Mr. Cho hopes that the model will help the CDC to better understand immunization coverage rates in the U.S.

Tonight I will be leaving for New York in order to present a paper at the Eastern Economic Association Annual Conference.

The paper is titled “Adam Smith meets Paulus Salk: Estimating the social cost of influenza vaccination regulation.” This research has been performed in conjunction with John Fontanesi (UCSD), Mark Messonnier (CDC), and Bo-Hyun Cho (CDC). Below is an abstract from the paper. The Healthcare Economist blog will return with new posts next week.

Influenza is the 7th leading killer in the United States. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines recommend that all parents of children between 0 and 60 months old should be vaccinated. Insurance companies, however, will not compensate pediatricians who administer influenza vaccinations to adults. This seemingly innocuous insurance company regulation, however, is creating large costs for society. Using an new observational data from a standardized workflow analysis tool, the cost of vaccination and the cost of the prohibition of pediatrician vaccination of adults is estimated. This paper finds the cost of the regulation to be between $4.4 and $140.5 million. If CDC policies altered its policies so that all parents of children 0 to 18 years old were required to receive and annual influenza vaccination, the cost of the regulation could increase to a figure as large as $417.5 million.

Defining sprawl is difficult. Los Angeles is generally seen to be a leader in sprawl, but in fact Los Angeles is the most densely populated urban area in the U.S; Portland is seen as a model of reducing urban sprawl, but sprawl increased by 25,000 acres in Portland between 1980 and 1990. While population growth certainly affects the rate of increase of urban sprawl, cities such as Detroit, Pittsburgh, Milwaukee, Cleveland, New York, Buffalo and Dayton all lost population between 1970 and 1990, but experienced significant sprawl.

Despite the fact that many newspapers and blogs rail against urban sprawl, Americans are continuing to move to the suburbs. Larger houses, bigger yards, and lower housing prices are some of the attractive features of suburban life. Critic of urban sprawl denounce suburbanites for a variety of reasons: from increased automobile pollution to creating “cookie-cutter” communities.

A spate of recent studies on urban sprawl and health may give critics of urban sprawl another point of contention. An article in Science News (“Weighing In on City Planning“) looks at a handful of these studies. Using a recent move from Atlanta to Vancouver, Lawrence Frank poses the hypothesis that more dense areas increase walking-time and decrease car-commuting time. Those who walk more and drive less are generally more healthy individuals. Cross-sectional evidence seems to show that this is the case.

Economist Matthew Turner argues otherwise. He proposed that individuals who have less active life styles migrate to the suburbs and those who enjoy walking move to urban areas. Thus, Frank’s finding of increased health in dense urban areas could be due to sorting. Using panel data, Turner measures the change in health level of individuals who move from urban to suburban areas (and vice versa) and finds that the move has no effect on health.

A final study by Frank concludes that “no matter how much people like or dislike being active, they are more active when they live in compact, walkable areas than when they live in sprawling neighborhoods.” Frank says that this “demonstrates that both preferences and the neighborhood in which people live impact their behavior.”

  • Also see a Reason magazine review of Lawrence Frank’s latest book – Urban Sprawl and Public Health: Designing, Planning and Building for Healthy Communities.

An interesting paper by Douglas Almond (2006) examines whether or not influenza infections of pregnant mothers can influence long-term outcomes of the in utero babies. Almond uses the 1918 “Spanish flu” pandemic in the United States as a source of exogenous variation to test the fetal origins hypothesis. The fetal origins hypothesis states that “certain chronic health conditions can be traced to the course of fetal development.”

The influenza outbreak of 1918 was brief (lasting only about 4 months), but deadly, killing more Americans than all combat deaths in the twentieth century. There were, however, 25 million individuals who contracted the deadly influenza strain and survived. Almond seeks to compare individuals born to pregnant mothers with the Spanish flu with a control group of individuals who were born from pregnant mothers without the virus. This is done two ways: using a dummy variable for being born in 1919 and using variation in one’s state of birth.

Using the 1919 dummy variable and comparing it to cohorts born between 1912 and 1922, Almond finds that the 1919 cohort had reduced educational attainment, increased rates of physical disability, lower income, lower socioeconomic status, and received more transfer payment than the surround cohorts.

In his secondary specification, the author examines 1960, 1970, and 1980 census data. Because census data include the state of birth for each person, Almond can trace use cross-state variation in infection rates from the 1919 Spanish flu. The author concludes that outcomes are worse for individuals born in 1919 in states with higher Spanish flu infection rates than for individuals born in 1919 in states with lower infection rates.

One may worry that the Spanish flu killed the less healthy or less ‘genetically endowed’ children in the 1918 cohort while the 1919 cohort survived because they were in utero. If this was the case, the 1918 cohort mean outcomes would be inflated and any differences may not be due to fetal development issues in the 1919 cohort, but the fact that the 1918 cohort may be more genetically endowed than usual. Almond finds that this is not the case, since the 1918 and 1920 birth cohorts have similar outcomes to the other birth cohorts in the 1912 to 1922 groups.

This paper gives robust evidence to support the fetal origins hypothesis. Prior epidemiological studies looked at famines, which tended to be more long-lasting and thus did not provide as much of a sharp, exogenous source of variation.

Most economists believe that increasing the price of an item will decrease demand for the item. Health care is no different from any other good. If you increase the copayment or coinsurance rate, people will consume fewer medical services. The famous RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) demonstrated that higher coinsurance rates discourage medical care consumption. As I said, health care is no different from any other good…or is it?

Dana Goldman and Tomas Philipson argue in their 2007 NBER working paper (“Integrated insurance design in the presence of multiple medical technologies“) that the problem of moral hazard in the health insurance market is different from moral hazard under most other insurance markets. For most other types of insurance, only one good is insured (e.g.: a car, a house, etc.). Health insurance, however, covers a wide variety of different services. Thus the authors claim that increasing prescription drug copay costs can actually increase health care spending and make patients worse off. Let us assume that prescription drugs and medical services are substitutes. If the price of prescription drugs increases, it is likely that the individual will consume the more of the expensive medical services which are fully covered by insurance. They suggest that a zero or negative copay may be optimal for some prescription drugs.

The optimal copay is determined by the patients elasticity of demand and the degree to which other medical services are complements or substitutes to the original item in question. The authors give some empirical evidence from other studies to support their claim:

  • Soumerai, Ross-Degnan, Avorn, McLaughlin and Choodnovsky (NEJM 1991) compare Medicaid patients in New Hampshire “who had a three-drug limit per patient” and Medicaid patients in New Jersey without the limit. The authors found a 35% reduction in drug use, but a doubling in nursing home admission rates.
  • Soumerai, McLaughlin, Ross-Degnan, Casteris, and Bollini (NEJM 1994) look at individuals on psychotropic medications and find that a drug cap led to a 15%-49% reduction in the use of drugs but a 43%-57% increase in mental health visits and emergency mental health services.
  • Horn, Sharkey, Tracey, Horn, James and Goodwin (Am. J Man Care 1996) find that formulary limitations in 6 HMOs were associated with increased ER visits and hospitalizations for otitis media, atraumatic arthritis, ulcers, hypertension, and asthma.
  • Gaynor, Li, and Vogt (NBER 2005) find that higher drug co-payments in a given year lead to increased spending during the following year.
  • On the other hand, studies such as Johnson, Goodman, Hornbrook and Eldredge (Med Care 1997) and Tamblyn, Reid, Mayo, McLeod, and Churchill-Smith (J Clin Epidemio. 2000) found that increased co-pays did not increase outpatient visits, hospitalizations or ER visits.

The authors conclude that “the preponderance of evidence suggests strong negative cross-price elasticities between drugs and other medical spending, at least for patients with chronic disease.”

If taxation reduces the amount of hours worked, why does Scandinavia—which has some of the world’s highest tax rates—have labor force participation (LFP) rates similar to the U.S? This is the question addressed by Richard Rogerson in the NBER working paper “Taxation and market work: Is Scandinavia an outlier?â€?

 

The study looks at three groups of countries: the U.S., the EU (Belgium, France, Germany and Italy), and Scandinavia (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden). Europeans and Scandinavians work approximately 1500 hours per employed person per year compared to the American figure of about 1850. In the year 2000, the employment to population ratio in Scandinavia is approximately 0.70, which is the same as in the U.S. Europe has an employment to population ratio of only 0.60 in 2000. We can see Scandinavia’s similarity to the U.S. workforce occurs mostly on the extensive margin. Yet, Scandinavia has the highest tax rates while the United States has the lowest. How can this be explained if taxes provide a disincentive to work?

 

Rogerson uses OECD and GGDC (Gronigen Growth and Development Center) data and claims that where the government revenue is spent can explain the differential. Government spending is divided into four categories as shown below.

 

Description Examples
Lump-sum transfer Education, health care
Wasteful spending Military, unnecessary public employment
Subsidy to leisure UI, disability, SS
Subsidy to work Child care for working mothers.
   

 

 

Rogerson contends that the EU has more government spending in the ‘subsidy to leisure’ category while Scandinavia spends more on ‘subsidy to work’ programs. The paper states that Scandinavia spends 8% of government spending on child and elderly care compared to only 2% in Europe. Further, government employment is highest in Scandinavia (i.e.: 15% in the U.S., 18% in Europe, and 28% in Scandinavia). Of course, government spending on employing individuals will increase the labor participation rates. Increased taxes decrease the incentive to work, but increased spending on programs which decrease the cost of going to work will increase labor force participation.

 

Rogerson then creates a model where households gain utility from consumption, leisure, and family services (e.g.: child care). In the model, taxes due decrease work incentives, but programs which decrease the price of child care increase the labor supply curve. The paper then argues that the differential in service employment explains the overall employment differential because the service sector is a proxy for the amount of child care. More and less expensive child care services make it easier for parents to enter the labor force.

 

    1960 1980 2000
Agric./Ind. US 27% 21% 18%
EU 38% 25% 18%
Scand. 41% 30% 20%
Services US 34% 43% 55%
EU 25% 32% 40%
Scand. 28% 45% 51%
         

This argument is very interesting and believable, but the evidence given is weak. The fact that Scandinavia has a higher service sector LFP rate does not necessarily mean that more child care is being given since the service sector includes everyone from economists, lawyers, technology consultants, fast food workers as well as child care specialists. More convincing evidence would include empirical data which showed that after a government increased child and elderly care spending, labor force participation also rose. Still, it seems obvious to Public Economists that Ricardian Equivalence will not hold in reality; where the government spends its money has significant effects on all markets.

 

 

In yesterday’s Wall Street Journal (“In China…“), there is an interesting article about health care in rural China. The article gets at the heart of a number of health care issues:

  • Physicians paid on a fee-for-service basis treat their patients more intensely compared to physicians paid on a salaried or capitation basis. In rural China, doctors made almost all of their annual earnings from prescribing pharmaceuticals. Thus, it comes as no surprise that patients were often over-prescribed drugs; some patients even died from excess drug prescription. “Ni Shiqiao, a 37-year-old doctor in a nearby village, whose father and grandfather were both village doctors, says that before the experiment started, he made nearly all his income selling prescription drugs. Now he makes a monthly salary and prescribes fewer drugs than before.” On the other hand, salaried doctor may under-treat patients since they make zero marginal revenue from most medical services they provide.
  • The benefits and costs of a government-run health care system. It is easy to see that when the health care system is federally run, the risk of any idiosyncratic negative health shock is spread across a large population. Nevertheless, rural farmers in China were hesitant to contribute to this risk-sharing national health plan. Harvard health economist William Hsiao states, “When the government collects money from them [the villagers], they often worry that the money is going into the pockets of the government officials, not beings used for the people.”
  • The pros and cons of decentralization. Dr. Hsiao started a program in which villagers would elect their own representative to administer their own health insurance funds. The village doctor would be hired and fired by this council. One can see that decentralization empowers villagers; “the more the villagers understood about where their money was going, the more they would want to participate.” Having decentralized health insurance, however, may not be optimal when risk is not idiosyncratic. For instance, if a virus was to infect all the farmers in a village, the local health insurance pool would likely not be sufficient in order to cover the necessary cost of treatment for each individual.

« Older entries