The National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) is a “not-for-profit organization dedicated to improving health care quality.” One of their major initiatives is the Health Plan Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) which aims to evaluate the quality of care offered by various health plans.
In a 2001 NBER working paper (“Learning…“), researchers Michael Chernew, Gautam Gowrisankaran and Dennis Scanlon look at employee data from General Motors and see whether or not the HEDIS health plan report cards affects plan choice. GM is a large national employer so authors are able to look at data for about 70,000 employees in many different markets over two years. Between years one and two, health plan report cards information was disseminated to non-union employees. GM employees use flex dollars to pay from health insurance plans categorized into 4 types: fee-for-service basic (FFSB), fee-for-service enhanced (FFSE), HMOs and PPOs.
Econometrics
The authors use a Bayesian learning model to evaluate the impact of the introduction of the health plan report cards to the employees. A person’s utility is assumed to depend on perceived health plan quality, price, other plan attributes and other unobserved factors. Using a nested logit model, the authors estimate the conditional distribution of quality at time 0 (i.e.: the prior) and the conditional distribution of quality at time 1 (i.e.: the posterior). The prior is a function of plan reputation and experience while the posterior is a function of the prior and the signal (i.e.: the HEDIS report card value). The authors also include plan-market fixed affects as well as plan type-time interactions.
The authors note: “Since we include a fixed effect for the prior quality of each plan in each market, endogeneity would occur only if particular ratings or changes in prices are correlated with changes in unobservable plan characteristics that might change market shares even in the absence of the changes in price or ratings.” The authors do not believe this to be the case, but it is very possible that health plans will shift resources from procedures which are included in the HEDIS quality measure and away from medical care whose quality level will not be captured in the HEDIS report card.
Results
The authors find that $100 increase in the price of a health plan will cause a 2.7% decrease in market share. Plans receiving a superior or average rating increased market share, but plans with below average or no data had reduced market share. The ‘no data’ category had the largest decrease in market share. The estimated value of the HEDIS information is about $20 for all people but $488 ex-post for the people who switched. The average value is small because only 12.4% of people switched plans in the sample after the HEDIS introduction and only about 3.9% switched plans due to the quality ratings. The authors conclude that “plan priors are more important than either ratings or prices,” which is likely due to 1) plan switching costs employees incur and 2) patient loyalty to their doctor.
50% lower than those that did not and had less-steep epidemic curves. Cities in which multiple interventions were implemented at an early phase of the epidemic also showed a trend toward lower cumulative excess mortality, but the difference was smaller (
Against Intellectual Property: Pharmaceuticals
April 30, 2007 in Books, Pharmaceuticals, Public Policy | 5 comments
There is a very interesting book titled Against Intellectual Monopoly by Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine which was brought to my attention by the author of the Behavioral Trader blog. In the book, the authors build their argument that patent protection is either wholly unnecessary or at the least too broad. Chapter 9 of the book review the pharmaceutical industry and today I will review of few of the authors main points.
The beginning portion of the chapter shows that there has been large cross-country variation in patent protection over time, and that the evidence shows that countries with patent protection are not more innovative than those without patent protection. For instance, Italy had limited or no patent protection for pharmaceuticals until 1978, and before that time was considered the leading manufacturer of generics. Between 1961-1980, Italy discovered 9.3% of the world’s new active chemical compounds, but between 1980-1983, Italy had only discovered 7.5% of the world’s new chemical compounds, despite the fact that Italian scientist now operated in a patent protection system. In recent years, India has claimed the title of the leading manufacturer of generics. In the “Prizes or patents” post, I mention the Chaudhuri, Goldberger and Jai article which finds that instituting mechanisms to enforce foreign patents in the Indian market would reduce welfare in the anti-bacterials segment by $305 million.
Innovation Chains
Innovation chains is a concept that patents prevent innovation by disallowing other firms from building on the work of others. For instance, a patent can be good for one pharmaceutical company, but not for others. While patents confer monopoly rights to the inventor, they preclude other companies from developing new drugs. For instance, the chief scientific officer at Bristol Myers Squib told the New York Times that:
Corruption
Because patents create rent-seeking behavior, corruption , lobbying and bribery are common in the pharmaceutical industry. Many pharmaceutical firms have pleaded guilty to criminal charges of fraud for inducing physicians to bill the government for some drugs that the company gave the doctors for free. For those who do not believe that rent-seeking is rampant in the pharmaceutical industry, just listen to Sharon Levine:
Where do useful drugs come from?
When the British Medical Journal revealed its list of the top 15 medical innovations, only 2 were obtained during a research project motivated by the desire for a patent. None of the CDC’s list of top 10 medical achievements of the past century had been patented when it was introduced. The authors note that private industry only pays for about 1/3 of biomedical R&D, while government institutions such as the NIH fund much of the rest. Boldrin and Levine propose the following solution so that pharmaceutical companies can recoup their large expense to preform clinical trials: