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	<title>Comments on: Insurance Markets and Advantageous Selection</title>
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		<title>By: Quora</title>
		<link>http://healthcare-economist.com/2008/01/30/insurance-markets-and-advantageous-selection/comment-page-1/#comment-12306</link>
		<dc:creator>Quora</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 04 May 2011 03:14:12 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>&lt;strong&gt;Why does the government regulate health care?...&lt;/strong&gt;

The traditional answer by economists is that the market outcome is inefficient due to adverse selection and moral hazard, and therefore government regulations can improve market outcomes. These issues were first brought up in 1965 in a paper by Kenneth...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Why does the government regulate health care?&#8230;</strong></p>
<p>The traditional answer by economists is that the market outcome is inefficient due to adverse selection and moral hazard, and therefore government regulations can improve market outcomes. These issues were first brought up in 1965 in a paper by Kenneth&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: Quora</title>
		<link>http://healthcare-economist.com/2008/01/30/insurance-markets-and-advantageous-selection/comment-page-1/#comment-12130</link>
		<dc:creator>Quora</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 27 Apr 2011 06:57:15 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://healthcare-economist.com/2008/01/30/insurance-markets-and-advantageous-selection/#comment-12130</guid>
		<description>&lt;strong&gt;Can a national health care plan increase the GDP? If so, what would be the features of the plan?...&lt;/strong&gt;

* Better health and longer life can have positive externalities, increasing total welfare, but it can also have negative externalities, such as increased pollution. * Countries can decrease healthcare spending to only 3% of GDP, by adopting Singapore&#039;...</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Can a national health care plan increase the GDP? If so, what would be the features of the plan?&#8230;</strong></p>
<p>* Better health and longer life can have positive externalities, increasing total welfare, but it can also have negative externalities, such as increased pollution. * Countries can decrease healthcare spending to only 3% of GDP, by adopting Singapore&#8217;&#8230;</p>
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		<title>By: The Realities of Market Failure &#171; The Confluence</title>
		<link>http://healthcare-economist.com/2008/01/30/insurance-markets-and-advantageous-selection/comment-page-1/#comment-4161</link>
		<dc:creator>The Realities of Market Failure &#171; The Confluence</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2009 18:21:38 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>[...] as rates are legally allowed to reflect risk, there is a lot of evidence that selection is actually advantageous rather than adverse.  Despite its massive citation count, Arrow&#8217;s paper is deeply wrong.  [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] as rates are legally allowed to reflect risk, there is a lot of evidence that selection is actually advantageous rather than adverse.  Despite its massive citation count, Arrow&#8217;s paper is deeply wrong.  [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Trading Eights &#187; Less Is More: The Ugly Truth about American Health Care</title>
		<link>http://healthcare-economist.com/2008/01/30/insurance-markets-and-advantageous-selection/comment-page-1/#comment-4160</link>
		<dc:creator>Trading Eights &#187; Less Is More: The Ugly Truth about American Health Care</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 26 Jul 2009 17:29:59 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>[...] this has been conventional wisdom in health economics for many years, but recent evidence suggests adverse selection is not as powerful as once thought. Part of the reason low-risk [...]</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>[...] this has been conventional wisdom in health economics for many years, but recent evidence suggests adverse selection is not as powerful as once thought. Part of the reason low-risk [...]</p>
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		<title>By: Nick E</title>
		<link>http://healthcare-economist.com/2008/01/30/insurance-markets-and-advantageous-selection/comment-page-1/#comment-523</link>
		<dc:creator>Nick E</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 01 Feb 2008 06:26:12 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Not that it necessarily invalidates the Finkelstein/McGarry analysis, but the HRS is not the best dataset for evaluating the purchasing of private insurance. The age of the sample implies that much of the sample transitioned into Medicare during across the panel waves, which is a pretty significant confounder.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Not that it necessarily invalidates the Finkelstein/McGarry analysis, but the HRS is not the best dataset for evaluating the purchasing of private insurance. The age of the sample implies that much of the sample transitioned into Medicare during across the panel waves, which is a pretty significant confounder.</p>
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