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	<title>Comments on: Empirical Model of Insurance Markets</title>
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		<title>By: Guy Thomas</title>
		<link>http://healthcare-economist.com/2009/11/05/empirical-model-of-insurance-markets/comment-page-1/#comment-5194</link>
		<dc:creator>Guy Thomas</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2009 15:16:06 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>&lt;i&gt;the welfare affects of adverse selection tend to be small in practice. &lt;/i&gt;


Why do economists always think of adverse selection as a cost?  It&#039;s a mis-measure of the efficacy of insurance.  Correctly conceived, (a modest degree of) adverse selection incrreases loss coverage, which is a benefit.  See &quot;Loss ocverage as a public policy objective for risk classification schemes&quot; http://tinyurl.com/cgal3g
or
&quot;Demand elasticity, risk classification and loss coverage: when can community rating work?&quot; http://tinyurl.com/da5z7y</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i>the welfare affects of adverse selection tend to be small in practice. </i></p>
<p>Why do economists always think of adverse selection as a cost?  It&#8217;s a mis-measure of the efficacy of insurance.  Correctly conceived, (a modest degree of) adverse selection incrreases loss coverage, which is a benefit.  See &#8220;Loss ocverage as a public policy objective for risk classification schemes&#8221; <a href="http://tinyurl.com/cgal3g" rel="nofollow">http://tinyurl.com/cgal3g</a><br />
or<br />
&#8220;Demand elasticity, risk classification and loss coverage: when can community rating work?&#8221; <a href="http://tinyurl.com/da5z7y" rel="nofollow">http://tinyurl.com/da5z7y</a></p>
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		<title>By: Steven Hales</title>
		<link>http://healthcare-economist.com/2009/11/05/empirical-model-of-insurance-markets/comment-page-1/#comment-5176</link>
		<dc:creator>Steven Hales</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2009 14:19:14 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Question:  In current HCR bills in the House and Senate won&#039;t insurance companies save a certain percentage of their SGA expenses when it is no longer possible under law to take into account the possibility of adverse selection?  

Follow up:  If true, then given that health insurers have MBRs in the high 70&#039;s to low 80&#039;s and some of the bills mandate MBRs of at least 85, will the savings be enough to prevent the average MBR from rising beyond profitability?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Question:  In current HCR bills in the House and Senate won&#8217;t insurance companies save a certain percentage of their SGA expenses when it is no longer possible under law to take into account the possibility of adverse selection?  </p>
<p>Follow up:  If true, then given that health insurers have MBRs in the high 70&#8242;s to low 80&#8242;s and some of the bills mandate MBRs of at least 85, will the savings be enough to prevent the average MBR from rising beyond profitability?</p>
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