November 2009

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Economist Tsung-Mei Cheng has developed three Universal Laws of Health Care Systems.  These are:

  1. No matter how good the health care in a particular country, people will complain about it.
  2. No matter how much money is spent on health care, the doctors and hospitals will argue it is not enough.
  3. The last reform always failed.

Source: The Healing of America, p. 26-27.

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Life is full of questions:

  1. What is the meaning of life?
  2. Which company will become the next Google?
  3. Is getting rid of medical underwriting the right thing to do?
  4. Should you risk choosing a business name that can be confused with a cuss word?

This blog carnival answers some of these questions [3, 4] and more, on the Q&A edition of the always informative Cavalcade of Risk.

HEALTH

INSURANCE (non-health)

BUSINESS

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America’s Health Ratings 2009 report ranks states according to overall healthiness.  Mississippi is the least healthy state and Vermont is the healthiest state.  The ranking methodology is available here.

The following states are the least healthy (starting with the least healthy):

  1. Mississippi
  2. Oklahoma
  3. Alabama
  4. Louisiana
  5. South Carolina
  6. Nevada
  7. Tennessee
  8. Georgia
  9. West Virginia
  10. Kentucky

The following states are the most healthy:

  1. Vermont
  2. Utah
  3. Massachusetts
  4. Hawaii
  5. New Hampshire
  6. Minnesota
  7. Connecticut
  8. Colorado
  9. Maine
  10. Rhode Island

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According to Eisenberg (Medical Care 2002):

Although physicians’ professional fees represent only one fifth of health care expenditures, they are responsible far decisions that govern the way that as much as 90% of each health care dollar is used.”

One way to change behavior is to give physician feedback. Here’s how to do it right:

…the simple transmission of feedback to physicians may alter behavior, but when it is provided in an impersonal manner (such as form letters), it is often considered to be offensive and threatening. Feedback is most successful when offered face-to-face by a respected member of the medical professional community, when it is individualized for the physician, and when it represents current or at least recent data.”

Links

Despite the spectacular failure of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, some economists insist that Fannie and Freddie need to be kept in place but somehow, just made safer. This optimistic advocacy—which assumes that Fannie and Freddie are like airplanes that need better landing gear—is in spite of the fact that between 1992 and 2008 Fannie and Freddie had their own regulator, the Office of Federal Housing Enterprises Oversight, that failed to stop the meltdown of Fannie and Freddie that has cost the U.S. taxpayer about $100 billion and counting.  Somehow, this time will be different.

  • Roberts, Russell (2009) How Little We Know,” The Economists’ Voice: Vol. 6: Iss.11, Article 3.

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T.R. Reid’s book The Healing of America looks at the best parts of health care systems around the world.  In France, one of the most interesting aspects of their health care system is the pricing mechanism.  Prices are regulated by the government and almost every doctor charges the same price for a given service.  While free marketers may abhor the centralized price setting, this system does have one advantage over the U.S. system: patients and doctors actually know the price of the medical services rendered.  This increases the transparency of how medical resources are allocated.  

However, the most interesting part of the French system is how they use copayments.  Patients must make a copay almost any time they receive medical services (the poorest citizens are exempt from this however).  The copayments work as follows:

My visit, a ‘consultation for joint pain or stiffness,’ was priced at €26, or $33.80.  Patients were expected to pay this fee at the time of the visit, and the insurance would reimburse the patient about 70 percent of the fee, or $25.  In other words, a visit to an orthopedic specialist would cost about $10 out of pocket.”  

The question is, why doesn’t the French system just charge a $10 copayment instead of going through the hassle of a $34 copay and then having to reimburse the patient.  When ask about the reimbursement scheme, one French doctor said: 

Does it seem impractical?…No, I think it is entirely reasonable.  Medical care is a valuable commodity.  Its value can be life or death.  When we ask the patient to pay that €21 in my office, we remind her that she is receiving a costly service. Even though she’s going to get the money back from insurance in a week, maybe two, it is important to convey that something of value is exchanged when they come to see us.  And maybe, if someone calls me to their home just out of loneliness, just to have a chat, maybe that person will spare me the trip because he doesn’t want to pay the €31.

In essence, the doctor is saying that the copayment reduces moral hazard.  However, why the reimbursement?  Hyperbolic discounting may explain the payment structure.  Many individuals will be indifferent between $100 one year from now and $110 two years from now.  However, a person with hyperbolic preferences will prefer $100 today to $110 one year from now.  Or they may even prefer $100 today to $110 one week from now.  

Hyperbolic discounting implies that the discount rate in the immediate future is much higher than it would be over a similar time span in the more distant future.  Thus, someone who has hyperbolic preferences may be willing to pay €20 for physician house call, but would not be willing to pay €31 for the visit, even if €21 would be reimbursed one week later.  While the reimbursement system adds some administrative expenses to the French health care system, it does reduce moral hazard.

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A paper by Thomas, Grazier, and Ward (2004) analyzes a variety of risk adjustment software products. Using these six risk adjustment products to calculate physician efficiency scores, they found “moderate to high levels of agreement were observed among the six risk-adjusted measures of practice efficiency.” However:

And even though our analyses suggest that 50 percent to 60 percent of adult PCPs identified by their system as being high outliers are likely to be identified by other profiling systems as well, the client has no way to know which of the identified outliers are the ones that multiple systems would agree on. Thus the profiling client must deal with practice efficiency rankings knowing that, in all likelihood, 40 percent to 50 percent of PCPs identified as high outliers are actually not among the least efficient 10 percent of primary care physicians.

The authors also compare two quality score metrics. The first is the ratio of the physician’s observed cost with the expected cost based on the physician’s patient’s risk scores. The O/E score is equal to:

  • (O/E)k=yk/Yk

Above, yk is physician k‘s observed score and Yk is their estimated score. The authors believe, however that the O/E score is not ideal. It is biased against providers who have a small sample size of patients. Thus, physician’s with smaller patient panels in the data set are more likely to be considered outliers. On the other hand, the authors advocate using a standardized cost difference (SCD). The SCD is calculated as follows:

  • SCDk=(yk-Yk)/[σ/(Nk)1/2]

The SCD measure explicitly takes into account the physician’s sample size. A large sample size will move the SCD more towards the difference in observed and expected costs; a small sample size will move the SCD score closer to the mean of 0.

Below is a list of the six risk adjustment tools used in the paper:

  • Adjusted Clinical Groups from Johns Hopkins University. Adjusted clinical groups cluster health plan members having similar comorbidities into groups that have similar resource requirements and clinical characteristics. The ACG Case-Mix System then uses a branching algorithm to place each patient into one of 82 discrete, mutually exclusive categories based on the mix of clinical groups experienced during the time period under study.
  • Burden of Illness Score from MEDecision, Inc. This system is based on MEDecision’s Practice Review System (PRS), which partitions care into episodes of illness and assigns services, severity levels, and medications to these episodes. The BOI Score is a linear-scaled measure that indicates relative health care cost risks associated with the particular mix of episodes experienced by a patient during a defined time period.
  • Clinical Complexity Index from Solucient, Inc. The CCI methodology considers age, severity, comorbidity, hospital admissions, and categories of diagnoses (acute, chronic, mental health, and pregnancy) to assign patients into mutually exclusive CCI risk categories. Although the system provides for 1,418 different categories, 95 percent of patients fall into just 45 of these.
  • Diagnostic Cost Groups from DxCG, Inc. The DCGsystem includes a whole family of multiple linear regression models.
  • Episode Risk Groups from Symmetry Health Systems,Inc. Like BOI Score, ERGs are episode-based. The episodes underlying ERGs are created using Symmetry’s Episode Treatment Groups (ETGt) methodology, a basic illness classification system that uses a series of clinical and statistical algorithms to combine related services into more than 600 mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. For a given patient, episodes experienced during a time period are mapped into 119 Episode Risk Groups, and then a risk score is determined based on age, gender, and mix of ERGs. For our analyses, we used the ERG retrospective risk score.
  • General Diagnostic Groups from Allegiance LLC. General Diagnostic Groups were developed using the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research’s Clinical Classification Software (CCS). CCS aggregates individual ICD-9-CM codes identified on health care claims into 260 broad diagnosis categories for statistical analysis and reporting. The GDG system then lumps together CCS categories considered to be clinically similar and to have similar associated per-patient charges into 57 diagnostic categories. These 57 diagnostic categories are used as dummy variables in a multiple regression model for predicting health care costs.

Source:

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According to a N.Y. Times editorial, the Congressional Budget Office has consistently underestimated costs savings from a variety of institutional changes to Medicare.  For instance:

Medicare enacts the prospective payments system (PPS) for reimbursing inpatient hospital stays.

  • The CBO projected total Medicare spending will rise to $60 billion in 1986.
  • Actual Medicare spending in 1986 was only $48 billion.

Medicare begins paying skilled nursing facilities and home health care services a set fee per patient.

  • The CBO projected a 9.1% reduction in Medicare spending.
  • The actual savings turned out to be 50 percent greater in 1998 and 113 percent greater in 1999 than the budget office forecast.

The Medicare Modernization Act created Part D prescription drug coverage.

  • The CBO projected that spending on the drug benefit would be $206 billion.
  • Actual spending was nearly 40 percent less than that.

HT: GoozNews

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