With state budgets running low, funding for police has fallen. Can private security forces step in to fill the gap? Temple Professor Simon Hakim believes so.
“The police is a monopoly. It’s less innovative than the private sector that is under the gun of competition. A police department will never go bankrupt; private company could go bankrupt. So private companies adopt more technology. I expect we may find contracting out of small police department, ’cause a lot of small police departments really don’t have the justification, in many cases, to exist. And for the consumers, they get better service in much lower costs.”
No one would question whether police have a monopoly, but whether this arrangement is welfare improving or not will depend on what the monopoly is over. Those who prefer private security firms often claim that the police have a monopoly over security. The logic then proceeds that allowing private competition will increase innovation as well as the equilibrium level of security supplied.
On the other hand, the police may not in fact be in the business of security but rather in the buiness of violence. In this case, one of the police’s fundamental roles is to restrain the supply of violence and, by doing so, making themselves more valuable.
One empirical example of a monopoly on violence comes from Colombia during the time of Pablo Escobar. Escobar was the unquestioned drug king of Medellín and–although he personally was very violent–he did not tolerate violence that he did not sanction. When Escobar died, the violence market was “open to competition” and the quantity of violence supplied grew exponentially.
Although many tragedies have occurred under the direction of state police, having a single (hopefully responsible) authority to maintain a monopoly on violence may, in fact, be optimal.

Book Review: This Time is Different
August 20, 2010 in Books, Economics - General | No comments
What is the history of financial crises? Why to they occur? Are they common? In the book This Time is Different, authors Reinhard and Rogoff assiduously review the history of government defaults and crisis of the financial system. Their data on government default is truly astounding. They document instance of government default in multiple ways: renegotiating the terms of a loan, failing to pay investors, and reducing the value of their debt through inflation or devaluation. Although defaults on external debt (from foreign investors) grab the of the headlines of the international media, default on domestic debt occurs as well.
Like most bubbles, the reason for these crisis is the delusion is that “this time is different.” Astronomical house prices relative to rent are interpreted as evidence of that past ideas of sound fundamentals are obsolete; highly leveraged investments of all types become more and more prevalent.
This is a book of economic history, but one where the last 5 chapters specifically examine how the conclusions drawn from centuries of historical data can be brought to bear to analyze the current Great Contraction. One of the points I found most interesting is that government debt almost always booms directly after a crisis, however, not for the reasons conventional wisdom ascribes. It is true that bailouts do add to this debt, but the main short term driver of booming U.S. debt is decreased tax revenues. During a financial crisis, the economy slows and tax receipts drop precipitously; hence the States’ recent request for more funding from the Feds.
This book is very worthwhile for economic historians and macroeconomists. The amount of evidence presented is overwhelming. The key points, however, are repeated over and over; after the first 100 pages, I felt I had already digested the main points. This is a book that I do recommend, even if I can’t say it was a page turner.
Tags: Books