HC Economist Models

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Last week, I officially graduated from the University of California-San Diego with a Ph.D. in Economics. After 5 years of advanced education, how would I reform the current health care system?  What principles are essential to a well-functioning health care system?  I answer these question below in the “Healthcare Economist Manifesto.”

 

Healthcare Economist Manifesto

General Comments

  1. Government-run health insurance.  I am neither for nor against government run health insurance.  There are compelling arguments on both sides.
    • For: Creates a more “equal” society; easiest way to decrease the number of uninsured; can solve the problem of adverse selection; lower administrative costs; benefits small business who otherwise would pay high load factors; experts can conduct cost-benefit analysis to see which medical treatments are truly necessary, taxes may not be distortionary if taxes for public health insurance are the same as the premiums people would have paid for private health insurance.
    • Against: May stifle innovation if new technologies depend on government approval; administrative costs savings may not be as high as anticipated; benefit generosity will grow over time as special interests lobby for inclusion in benefits; stifles innovation of new health insurance products; more generous benefits can increase the moral hazard problem; experts may be corrupted and cost-benefit agencies have lost credibility in Congress (see AHCPR history); in times of economic crisis, health benefits will need to be cut; will put a strain on the budget (see Medicare unfunded liabilities); will necessarily lead to higher taxes.
  2. Physician Payment.  How should physicians be paid?  Fee-for-service?  Salary?  Capitation?  There is no clear cut answer.
    • Fee-for-service payment gives doctors incentives to perform too much care.  Capitation gives an incentives for doctors to do too little.  My research finds that when specialists are paid through a fee-for-system scheme rather than on a capitation basis, surgery rates increase 78%.  Further, paying primary care doctors capitation (without a gatekeeper) will increase referrals to specialist and drive up costs.
    • It is easier to pay fee-for-service for procedures.  However, the ideal payment structure may depend on what we want doctors to do.
    • Do we want to pay doctors as guardian professionals or commercial innovators?
    • The Mayo Clinic pays a salary and provides excellent healthcare, but it may be difficult to replicate the Mayo culture throughout the country.
  3. Too little care or too much?
  4. Rationing.  In most places in the U.S., if say the ‘R’ word you’ll be called a socialist.  However, any economist knows that all scare goods are rationed.  In a completely free-market system, prices ration goods–only those willing to pay the selling price are able to acquire the good.  Currently, private health plans ration care by what is included in their list of benefits.  Pay a higher price and you’ll get more generous benefit coverage.  Private health plan administrators are the final arbitrators (read: ‘rationers’) in deciding whether a treatment will be paid for.  If the government took over the supply of health care, bureaucrats and not prices would determine what would be covered.  Whatever system we choose, it is naive to believe that rationing will not occur.  Whether this rationing will take place through prices, private health plan administrators, or government bureaucrats will depend on the system we choose.
  5. Reducing Supplier-induced-demand is the key to reducing costs.  When you take your care to the repair shop and your mechanic says you need a new timing belt or catalytic converter, how do you know you really need it?  Unless you’re an auto expert, you likely will either have to take their advice, or seek a second opinion.  Car repair, like medical care, is typically an experience good. When physicians prescribe a treatment, the patient will almost always accede to the doctor’s recommendation.  This is even more so the case since most patients have insurance, and thus will be largely insulated for the cost of providing the service.  Getting physicians to be more cost conscious is the key to reducing health care costs in America.

What should we do?

Any health reform that I would support should have the following components:

  1. Private health insurance:  But I thought you said you were ambivalent about government-run health insurance?  That is true.  Whether or not there exists a government-run health insurance system, individuals must have the choice to use private insurance.  
    • Private health insurance provides some market discipline even if there is a public health insurance system.  The public health care system can learn from innovations from private health plans and vice versa.  If waiting times or quality ever worsen significantly, individuals should always have the right to purchase their own private health coverage.
    • Private health insurance could also be a testing ground for new innovations.  With a single payer system, a treatment is either adopted or it is not.  If the treatment begins to make patients worse off, this will affect a great many people.  On the other hand, it would be less risky if the treatment was first covered by private insurance and only later–after it was proven successful–would the government health  plan include it in its list of benefits.
  2. Out-of-pocket payments.  When something is free, people do not value the good nearly as much as when they pay for it.  Thus, to limit overuse of the healthcare system, copayments, coinsurance and deductibles need to be implemented.  These payment can–and should–be lower for the poor but they should not be zero.  
    • Even Nobel Laureate Muhammed Yunus said: “I think it’s very important to have the patients, the people who are asking for health services, to pay. How that payment will be made…it can be in a variety of ways. But the important thing is they must pay. They must feel that this is a service they are buying so that they feel equal, so they don’t feel small.”
    • Copayment and coinsurance rates must be sensibly designed.  While basic catastrophic health insurance (i.e., coverage for serious illnesses, but not basic primary care) may sound reasonable from an economic theory point of view, it gives patients an incentive to go the emergency room for basic medical needs and preventive care.  Going to the emergency room for simple issue is not cost effective.  Copayment and coinsurance rates should help to direct patients to the most cost efficient alternative.  
  3. Reduce patent length.  I have mulled over supporting the elimination of patents all-together, but as of now I’ll at least strongly support the reduction in the length of patents.  Patents give producers a monopoly over certain goods produced for a given amount of time.  This creates short-run inefficiencies, which may be outweighed in the long-run if companies increase innovation.  So why should we shorten patent length?  Boldrin and Levine provide some compelling arguments.
    • Patents do not increase innovation: Before Italian patent protection 1961-1980: Italy discovered 9.3% of the world’s new active chemical compounds.  After Italian patent protection: 1980-1983, Italy discovered only 7.5% of the world’s new chemical compounds.  India also has limited patent protection, but is generating many of major pharmaceutical advances.  Another study shows that strong copyright protections also do not increase innovation.
    • Innovation Chains:  Patents prevent innovation by disallowing other firms from building on the work of others
    • Rent Seeking: Patents give companies an incentive to higher lawyers (to extend patent length and increase the scope of the patent) rather than researchers (who invent and innovate).
  4. Public Health.  Public health must continue to be an important part of the health care system.  As the swine flu outbreak shows, there is no greater threat to civilization than the spread of a deadly contagious disease.  Vaccinations have helped stop some of these diseases in their tracks, but their is a constant threat of a new outbreak.  Further, public health initiatives such as clean water and basic sanitation can do much more to improve health than medical care after one becomes sick (see posts on El Salvador).  However, public health should not focus on telling people what to do when it only affects their own health.  For instance, we need to reduce spending on campaigns against smoking, drinking and obesity.  People generally know what’s healthy and what’s not and should be able to decide what to do for themselves.
  5. Electronic Medical Records (EMR).  We need them.  Having the government do it would provide a single platform for all providers and would easily allow patients to transfer records between doctors.  However, the government is a dinosaur and new EMR innovations would take a while to be implemented under the government system.  Further, the U.S. already has some high quality EMR systems in place (see the VA and Kaiser Permanente).  Regardless of whether the government or private health insurance creates EMR, privacy concerns are paramount.  Further, EMR are not a cure all.  While they will almost certainly improve care–especially coordination of care–Margalit et al. (2006)finds that in Israel, “physicians spent close to one-quarter of visit time gazing at the computer screen.”
  6. More money for primary care.  Less for specialists. This is not an absolute statement.  In some countries, specialists may be rare and underpaid, but in the U.S., it is primary care physicians who are underpaid.  The focus in the U.S. health care system now is on procedures and tests where we should focus on the more cost effective primary care.  Nurse practitioners and physicians assistants can supply care focused on more time with the patients.  Innovative forms of delivering primary care–such as retail clinics at pharmacies–should be encouraged.
  7. Certification, not licensure.  Doctors are expensive.  Why?  For three reasons: 1) they provide high value services, 2) going to medical school is costly, 3) they participate in a cartel known as the AMA. It has been shown by many studies that the AMA cares more about physician profits than patient health. Because physicians need a license to practice, they limit supply and drive up prices.  Costs would drop if only certifications were required.  (See my series of posts on licensure).  In many instances, the certification/licensure debate would not produce any real change because physician training for both licensure and certification would be nearly identical.  On the other hand, patients could pay more to see doctors with better/more certifications while still being able to save money by going to a provider with worse/less education.  Certifications would also allow talented physicians to perform cross-discipline procedures.  For instance, ophthalmologists have frequently prevented optometrists from conducting certain treatments through license requirements.
  8. Don’t reinvent the wheel.  Medical care in America is not optimal, but that does not mean that we need to throw out the baby with the bath water.  There are many examples in the U.S. of where superior health care is provided at a reasonable price.  These include the Mayo Clinic, Kaiser Permanente, Hill Physicians Medical Group, and the Marshfield Clinic.  Even the UK’s National Health Service was born out of existing institutions.

Does a template for U.S. health reform exist?

There are two countries that have a model that may work for the U.S.: the Netherlands and Switzerland.  Both use private health insurance to cover patients, but have nearly universal health insurance coverage.  [Universal coverage may be easier to achieve in these smaller, more homogeneous countries than in the U.S., however.]  The Dutch system allow individuals to still get coverage through their employers if they so choose, but employers need not offer health insurance.  Individuals pay their own health insurance premiums, but these premiums are subsidized depending on household income.

Neither of these countries models is a perfect fit for the U.S., but they do have attractive elements.  Like any policy discussion, the devil is in the details.  In order to have true health care reform, we must incentivize patients and providers to maximize health care quality for the lowest cost.

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Vaccination is one of the most cost effective medical treatments we have.  It is important that providers vaccines in a timely manner.

In attempt to streamline vaccine distribution systems, the CDC created Vaccine Management Business Improvement Project (VMBIP).  Instead of having providers place orders with the grantee (i.e.: state health department), and then having the grantee ship them to a local distributor, VMBIP is an attempt to reduce warehouse costs by shipping vaccines from a centralized warehouse directly to the provider.  This may save money, if the vaccines are sent in a timely manner.

My presentation at the National Immunization Conference analyzed some data from southern California providers and found that the time from the vaccine order being place to delivery increased from 1.6 work days to 13.5 workdays after VMBIP was implemented.  I received other anecdotal evidence that these delays were affecting the vaccine supply of many California providers, but I did not know how efficiently the VMBIP program was operating in other states.

I found that California’s 13.5 day delay may not be so bad compared to the rest of the country.  One nurse from Texas said that vaccines delivery could take as long as 6 weeks.  There was significant variability so that the clinic would run out of vaccines occasionally so would have to place their orders early.  Sometime the vaccines would arrive within 2 days, but since the provider had anticipated a 2-4 week delay, there was no room in the refrigerator to store the vaccine.

Another conference attendee explained to me her experience in Minnesota.  Vaccines must be stored at a certain temperature to ensure they do not spoil.  Some winter days are so cold in Minnesota that the state public health department would advise distributors not to ship on those days to insure that they would not freeze.  Under the new, centralized VMBIP system, the national warehouse–which is run by McKesson–was not sensitive to these regional variations.  Minnesota providers have received frozen vaccines since McKesson did not know about how Minnesota winters effect vaccines.  These frozen vaccines are completely useless and must be discarded.

Overall, I doubt that centralized vaccine distribution is a good model.  Wal-mart can operate a centralized distribution system because all the stores are on the same computer network, they work under the centralized location, and receive extensive logisitcs training.  Further, Wal-mart is a hierarchical organization.  On the other hand, physicians are not integrated into a public health IT database–VACMAN not withstanding.  Further, providers are well trained on medical issues, but not logistics or filling out forms.  Since vaccine distribution is not a hierarchical system, a more flexible, less centralized, system would likely be optimal.

I would like to thank all the people who attended my presentation today at the National Immunization Conference and all the helpful feedback I have received.

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According to Reuters (“All U.S. kids…“), the CDC’s Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP) is recommending that all kids should receive an influenza vaccination. Previously, the CDC recommended that all children 0-6 receive a flu shot. Now, all children 18 and under should get the shot.

In addition to the direct health benefits the children will receive from a decreased likelihood of getting the flu, the probability that they will spread it to adults, teachers, other children, and senior citizens will decrease.

However, there will be costs to the flu vaccine expansion. According to the U.S. Census, there were 61.3 million children aged 5-19 in the U.S. Getting all these children vaccinated will be very costly and since the vaccines will be given in the fall, the logistics of providing 61 million additional flu shots will be difficult to manage.

Further, one of my working papers (“Adam Smith meets Jonas Salk: Estimating the Social Cost of Third-Party Influenza Vaccination Restrictions“) finds that when kids 0-18 year old must receive a flu vaccine efficiency losses could increase to as much as $560 million if insurance companies continue to prohibiting reimbursement to pediatricians for vaccinating adults.

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Tonight I will be leaving for New York in order to present a paper at the Eastern Economic Association Annual Conference.

The paper is titled “Adam Smith meets Paulus Salk: Estimating the social cost of influenza vaccination regulation.” This research has been performed in conjunction with John Fontanesi (UCSD), Mark Messonnier (CDC), and Bo-Hyun Cho (CDC). Below is an abstract from the paper. The Healthcare Economist blog will return with new posts next week.

Influenza is the 7th leading killer in the United States. Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) guidelines recommend that all parents of children between 0 and 60 months old should be vaccinated. Insurance companies, however, will not compensate pediatricians who administer influenza vaccinations to adults. This seemingly innocuous insurance company regulation, however, is creating large costs for society. Using an new observational data from a standardized workflow analysis tool, the cost of vaccination and the cost of the prohibition of pediatrician vaccination of adults is estimated. This paper finds the cost of the regulation to be between $4.4 and $140.5 million. If CDC policies altered its policies so that all parents of children 0 to 18 years old were required to receive and annual influenza vaccination, the cost of the regulation could increase to a figure as large as $417.5 million.

In an attempt to reduce costs, Medicare enacted a Prospective Payment System (PPS) in 1983. Medicare aimed to pay hospitals a fixed rate based on the Diagnosis Related Group (DRG) plus/minus an adjustment for location and local wage. Although this system gives hospitals the incentive to misclassify patients into high profit DRG, I will assume for simplicity that the hospital diagnose the patient’s illness with perfect accuracy. I briefly outline a model in order to analyze how PPS effects hospital (or providers) incentives.

The Model

The hospital makes a profit on each patient of: P-C(s)-c(q(s))

  • P is the reimbursement rate from Medicare based on the DRG; C(s) is a cost function depending on sickness, c(q(s)) is the additional cost incured by the hospital for additional quality of care. C’,C”,c’,c”,D’,D” are all strictly positive.

Total profits for the hospital are: D(q)*[P-C(s)-c(q)]; where D(q) is the consumer’s demand function. Firms maximize profits by choosing the quality level for each sickness type. The first order condition for the firm is:

  • D’[P-C(s)-c(q)]=D*c’(q)

If we totally differentiate the above equation (remember q is a function of s), we have:

  • d(q(s))/d(s)=[D''(P-C-c)-2D'c'-Dc'']/[D'C'] <0

Discussion
What does all this math mean? Well since dq(s)/ds<0, this means that discretionary quality falls with severity for all profitable patients and is set to zero for unprofitable patients. Since the PPS payment system does not reimburse providers for additional quality of their work with patients, these providers have an incentive to decrease quality. On the other hand, if we construct a 'cost-plus' system where hospitals are reimbursed at (1+x%) of cost, hospitals have an incentive to treat the most severe illnesses since they are the most profitable.

Models as developed in: Meltzer and Chung (2002) “Effects of Competition Under Prospective Payment on Hospital Costs Among High- and Low-Cost Admissions: Evidence from California in 1983 and 1993″ Forum for Health Economics and Policy, Vol 5(4).

While many poor people do not have insurance, a great majority have access to some type of care.  For instance, all people have access to emergency room services.  I currently volunteer at one of the many free clinics located in San Diego county.  Thus, lack of insurance is not equivalent to absence of medical care.

A brief model I have created may help explain how poor individuals choose their optimum number of work hours and amount of health care consumption.

Individuals are utility maximizers and maximize the following function:

U(C,h,l), s.t.:

  • C+p*s+=I+wL;   if p*s
  • C=c; if p*s>I+wL-c
  • h=f(s);
  • l+L=N
  • p=P+t

C‘ is total consumption, ‘h‘ is a person’s health which is a function of health care spending ‘s‘.  ‘l‘ is leisure and ‘L‘ is hours of work; these two variables must sum to the total hours in a year ‘N‘.  ‘I‘ is non-wage income.  ‘c‘ is the lower bound of consumption.  ‘p‘ is the price of health care.

A middle class or wealth person will generally want a C>c and will maximize subject to the first budget constraint.  The first order conditions for them are:

  • U_c = (U_l)/w = ((U_h)*f)/p

Poor individuals will generally choose another option.  I assume that one can get as much medical services as one pleases by going to free clinics or the emergency room; by doing so, however, one is relegated to a minimal consumption level since a hospital or medical services provider will be able charge a patient for its services, unless the person is extremely poor.  The provider could not collect an amount which would lower a person’s consumption below ‘c‘.

Thus, people using the second budget constraint (generally the poor), will have:

  • C=c; L=0; s=infinity.

Since any money earned by the poor individual will simply be used to pay medical bills, this person has no incentive to work.  Further, since health care is free, the person will want to consume an infinite amount of services.  In reality, medical care is not completely free to an individual since there are travel and time costs so ‘s‘ will be finite.

Nevertheless, this simple model would provide some rational for the Medicaid program.  I am not generally in favor of government administered health insurance, however, if the poor are able to force suppliers of medical services to provide their services free of charge, this will imply a higher price for those able to pay for the services.  Another option would be to not offer the poor medical services unless they paid.  Fortunately for the disadvantaged, our society has rejected this notion.

The design of legislation which regulates Medicaid eligibility creates a poverty trap. In California, generally those who have income below 250% of the federal poverty level and who have limited assets are eligible for Medicaid. (In reality California’s Medicaid eligibility is more complicated than this. For full details of eligibility requirements see “Medi-Cal Facts and Figuresâ€? produced by the California HealthCare Foundation.)

Let me explain how the poverty trap functions. Let us examine an individual which earns 249% of the federal poverty level. The individual may desire to work more hours, but by doing so, he/she will lose the Medicaid benefit. Thus, by working more, the individual is actually worse off.

Here is my model which will describe this phenomenon mathematically. Consumers are utility maximizers:

max(c,h,l) U; U=(1-p)c + p[c-S-a*ln (1+ h +M*)]+g(l)

  • s.t.: c+p(1+j)h+wl=w{L_bar}
  • c>=0, h>=0, 0<=l<={L_bar}
  • c: consumption
  • S: disutility from being sick
  • p: probability of getting sick
  • M*: Medicaid Benefit, M*=0 if wL>E. Otherwise M*=M
  • E: Eligibility limit on Medicare, in California 250% of the poverty line
  • h=health insurance purchased
  • w= wage
  • l=leisure, L=hours worked, {L_bar}=total hours in time period
  • gamma=shadow price of income
  • g’>0; g”<0

 

The first order conditions are:

    • d c: gamma=1
    • d h: h*=a/(1+j) – 1 – M*
    • d l: g’(l)=w; L={L_bar} – g’_^{-1}(w)

Since h* does not depend on c, L, or w; dc/dL>0 on the support where c, L are continuous. However, if L=(E-e)/w where e is an arbitrarily small positive number, then increasing L by a non-differential amount will decrease consumption. Since h* does not depend on l or c, the individual will choose the same h* with or without the Medicaid benefit (assuming h*>=M). Thus, the poor individual near the Medicare eligibility limit will actually be worse off by working more. This is a poverty trap.

Conservatives often claim that the poor are lazy. While this is certainly true in some cases, and while drugs are an overwhelming problem for the poor, the vast majority of the poor are hard working individuals. They are not stupid, however. As this model shows, when working more hours leads to less disposable income, it is entirely rational to limit hours worked in order to collect the government benefit.

A voucher program could eliminate this problem. The voucher program would have the following model:

max(c,h,l) U; U=(1-p)c + p[c-S-a*ln (1+ h)]+g(l)

  • s.t.: c+p(1+j)h+wl=w{L_bar} + V*
  • c>=0, h>=0, 0<=l<={L_bar}
  • V*={h_bar}p(1+j) if h>={h_bar} and V*=0 if h<{h_bar}

In essence, this would allow the government to pay for an individual’s insurance up to {h_bar}, but workers who decide not to purchase insurance would not receive this subsidy. Since, the government will be giving free health insurance, it is irrational to not choose h*>={h_bar}. V* does not depend on earnings and thus there is no disincentive to work.