Health Reform

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Governor Chris Christie vetoes a bill today that would form have created a health exchange in New Jersey.

“While I appreciate the Legislature’s attempt to find steady policy footing in these shifting legal sands, I am concerned that a hastily created exchange in New Jersey will impose unnecessary obligations upon the state’s citizens,” Christie said in his veto message. “I believe the better course of action … is to continue to monitor the ever-changing landscape surrounding the implementation of the Affordable Care Act, and to refrain from imposing its mandates upon our citizens until outstanding issues are settled.”

Will ObamaCare ever be implemented?  And if so, what provisions will be implemented in which states?  This is an open question that will not come close to being resolved until the Supreme Court makes its decision on the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.

Joe Paduda has some interesting points:

requiring insurers accept all applicants is favored by most Republicans (according to Politico) but a) some senior Republicans hate the idea and b) there’s zero consensus re how to actually make that work. Do they forbid upcharging for older/sicker people? Adopt some form of risk-adjustment and/or financial transfer among/between insurers based on the risk profile of their members? Or allow the free market to operate, hoping that insurers will somehow figure out how to insure people with pre-existing conditions at affordable rates?

One option–an individual mandate–is certainly off the table for Republicans.  So the question is, if you want to prohibit insurers for varying premiums based on your health condition, how do you prevent premiums from skyrocketing or insurers acting illegally to avoid certain types of enrollees.  The answer to this question is not a simple one in the political realm.

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Today, the Supreme Court is deciding  whether to let many of the provisions of the Affordable Care Act (a.k.a. ACA, a.k.a. Health Reform, a.k.a. Obamacare) stand.  One of the key provisions is the individual mandate.  The individual mandate requires all individuals to purchase health insurance.  If you don’t buy health insurance, you must pay a penalty or fine.

The reason Obama claims the individual mandate is necessary is due to the prohibition of setting premiums based on pre-existing conditions.  Currently, if you don’t have insurance, you become ill and try to buy insurance, it is very expensive.  The ACA, however, would prohibit insurers from price discriminating based on your health status.  Although this may sound good in theory, there are problems in practice if the individual mandate is not in place.  Many individuals will have an incentive not to buy insurance when they are healthy.  When they become sick, they can purchase an insurance plan for the same price as someone who has had insurance for 10 years.  Because only sick people will be insured, the average cost of health insurance will rise for everyone.  Hence, the need for the individual mandate arises.

The individual mandate, however, may not be constitutional.  Can the government compel individuals to buy something?  Many states already require auto insurance.  This requirement is only applied to those who own a car whereas the only condition for the health insurance mandate is that you are alive.

Americans have already found a way around this problem, however.  Medicare’s prescription drug program (Medicare Part D) is an optional program.  No one has to buy prescription drug coverage.  Further, premiums do not vary based on health status (although insurers receive different subsidies based on individual’s health conditions).

To incentivize individuals to purchase prescription drug coverage while they are healthy, Medicare Part D relies on a late enrollment penalty.  Any individual who does not purchase prescription drug coverage when they are eligible has to pay an increased premium when they are eligible.  This increased premium depends not on your health status, but on the number of months you were not enrolled when eligible.  From the Medicare website:

The late enrollment penalty is calculated by multiplying 1% of the “national base beneficiary premium” ($31.08 in 2012) times the number of full, uncovered months you were eligible but didn’t join a Medicare drug plan and went without other creditable prescription drug coverage. The final amount is rounded to the nearest $.10 and added to your monthly premium.

This approach could solve both problems.  The one short-coming is determining how much the late-enrollment penalty should be for private plans.  Allowing the government to set prices is generally a poor idea.  One could allow private plans to set the late enrollment penalty, as long as this were regulated to prohibit price discrimination based on individual health status.  Although this approach certainly has a number of challenges, it may be more palatable to the American public (and the Supreme Court) than an individual mandate.

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Although Health Reform did little to reduce the cost of health care, it did make significant strides to expand access to care.  For low-income individuals, the increased access comes along two dimensions: expanded Medicaid eligibility and increased physician fees.  Specifically, Health Reform required to

  • Make all individuals with incomes below 138% of the Federal Poverty Line (FPL) eligible for Medicaid, and
  • Increase their Medicaid physician fee schedules, so that they are no lower than Medicare’s for evaluation and management services provided by primary care physicians.

Whereas the first provision is permanent, the second provision is to be in effect only for 2013 and 2014.

Which one will have a bigger effect? According to a paper by White (2012), paying doctors more improves access.

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Health reform not only changes the health care market for the demand side (e.g., patients, insurers), but also for the supply side (e.g., hospitals, physicians).  In the Medicare setting, a number of initiatives have aimed to pay providers who provide high-quality or low-cost care more money, and pay providers who provide low-quality or high-cost care less money.  CSC provides a nice overview of some of these initiatives.

  • Performance Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) — Offers increased update to diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment rates to hospitals according to demonstration of performance or improvement in designated performance areas relative to performance standards and benchmarks.
  • Shared Savings Program — For groups of providers who form an Accountable Care Organization (ACO), potentially shares a portion of financial savings in caring for Medicare patients if performance standards are met, according to performance rated on a sliding scale against benchmarks.
  • Readmission Reduction Program (RRP) — Decreases annual adjustments to DRG payment rates for hospitals that are in the lowest performance quartile for excess readmissions of Medicare patients with selected discharge diagnoses.
  • HAC Payment Limitation — Decreases annual adjustments to DRG payment rates for hospitals that are in the lowest performance quartile for a designated set of Hospital-Acquired Conditions (HACs).
  • Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative — One of several initiatives of the CMS Innovation Center to give doctors and hospitals new incentives to coordinate care, improve the quality of care and save money for Medicare. Bundle care for a package of services patients receive to treat a specific medical condition during a single hospital stay and/or recovery from that stay. Applicants pick conditions to target and one of four ways to define the extent of pre- and post-hospital care included in the bundled payment.

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The answer depends on the state. Today, I examine an Urban Institute research paper that looks at this progress in more detail.

Dividing States into 3 Group

The most advance States fall into Group 1 (CA, CO, CT, DC, HI, IN, MA, MD, NV, OR, RI, UT, VT, WA, WV). These states have either enacted an exchange establishment law or in which the governor has established one by issuing an executive order. Massachusetts and Utah had already passed exchange laws before enactment of the ACA. All Group 1 states (except Colorado, Massachusetts and Utah) have received an exchange establishment grant.

Group 2 states (AL, AZ, DE, IA, ID, IL, KY, ME, MI, MN, MO, MS, NC, NE, NJ, NM, NY, PA, TN, VA, WI) have not yet established exchanges, but have demonstrated significant interest in doing so. Most notably, 17 of the 21 states have received level 1 federal establishment grants, which represent a second round of funding for state exchange development work beyond the initial state planning grants. Although Wisconsin has not received a level 1 federal establishment grant, Wisconsin is using federal funds to develop an IT system to fully integrate exchange eligibility determination and enrollment with state-based public insurance programs (i.e., Medicaid and CHIP). Recently, however, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker has rejected all federal funding for implementation of the ACA. Of the remaining four states, Virginia and Wisconsin have passed legislation stating its intent to develop an exchange, although they have not yet passed exchange establishment legislation, New Jersey has establishment legislation pending in its legislature, and Pennsylvania’s governor has recently announced that his administration is taking steps to establish a state exchange.

Group 3 states (AK, AR, FL, GA, KA, LA, MT, ND, NH, OH, OK, SC, SD, TX, WY) do not meet any of the criteria for Groups 1 and 2 and are the furthest from successfully implementing the ACA provisions.

Correlation between Exchange Progress and Potential Increases in State Health Insurance Coverage

A research article from the Urban Institute finds that States with the ‘most to gain’ from the ACA are actually the most likely to fall into Group 3. States that currently have the least generous Medicaid programs and the largest share of uninsured workers are the least likely to have made significant progress in implementing the ACA provisions.

I can think of two reasons for this finding. The first is philosophical. These States began with less generous health insurance programs. Thus, the residents (or politicians) in these States may prefer to have less generous health insurance programs than other States. Hence the natural aversion to implementing the ACA provisions. The second reason is financial. Because these States have the largest share of uninsured individuals, they would also incur the largest percentage increase in cost to finance the ACA provisions. Although it is true that these States would likely receive the largest subsidies, these subsidies will not cover the full cost of the ACA implementation.

Questions States need to answer to implement an Exchanges

  • Should the exchange be run by an existing government agency, a new agency, a quasi-governmental entity or a not-for-profit private entity?
  • What should the composition of the governing board be?
  • How should the administrative costs of running an exchange be financed?
  • Should the exchange be able to actively negotiate with plans over premiums?
  • Can plans be excluded, or must all qualified plans be allowed to participate?
  • In computing premiums, should enrollees in the Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP) exchange and nongroup exchange markets be pooled together, or should their premiums be set separately?
  • What will be the role of agents and brokers in the exchange?
  • Should state insurance regulations be identical inside and outside the exchange?
  • How will Medicaid/CHIP eligibility and enrollment be integrated with the exchange?
  • Should the Basic Health Plan option be implemented?

Source: Blavin F, Buettgens M and Roth J “State Progress Toward Health Reform Implementation: Slower Moving States Have Much to Gain.” RWJF and Urban Institute Real Time Policy Analysis, January 2012.

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One of the provisions in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (a.k.a ACA, a.k.a. Health Reform, a.k.a. Obamacare) is that it limits the profits of health insurance companies.  The ACA imposes a minimum medical loss ratio (MLR) on all insurers.  The MLR is the amount of money spent on covered person medical care divided by the total revenue received through premiums.  There is some debate of what constitutes ‘medical care’ (e.g., do investments in electronic health records count as medical care?), but insurer profits certainly are non-medical.

The ACA requires health insurers in the individual and small group market to spend 80 percent of their premiums (after subtracting taxes and regulatory fees) on medical costs.  The corresponding figure for large groups is 85 percent.  According to a recent Kaiser tracking poll, 60 percent of the public views the MLR concept favorably, although only 38 percent was aware that the provision is in the ACA.  Insurance brokers may be getting squeezed for insurers to meet this amount.

Even though the MLR is a national law, it may not apply in your state.  Why?  Because many States are petitioning for a waiver.  HHS is currently reviewing applications from six states: Florida, Kansas, Michigan, Texas, Oklahoma and North Carolina.  According to The National Association of State Budget Officers, HHS has granted waivers to seven states: Maine, New Hampshire, Kentucky, Nevada, Iowa, Georgia and Wisconsin. The department has denied them to Delaware and North Dakota.

Why did these States receive waivers?  For a variety of reasons, but one of the reasons is due to the fact that some states have a less competitive medical market.  Maine, for instance, requested a MLR of 65%.  The reason was that State only has two large commercial insurers, Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield (with 49% of the market) and MEGA Life and Health Insurance Company (with 33% of the market).  A public-private partnership, DirigoChoice, makes up most of the rest of the market.  Three HMO’s have less than 1% of the market combined between them.  To avoid the case where a large insurer would leave the market due to minimum MLR requirements and create a near monopoly, HHS decided to approve Maine’s request.

Notes:

  • Section 2718 of the Public Health Services Act implements the minimum medical loss ratio requirement.

The National Association of State Budget Officers

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For many years, fee for service payment was the status quo. FFS model encourages hospitals to adopt the following strategies to maximize market share and profits:

  • Centered on short-term acute care
  • Focused on specialist alignment
  • Driven by a volume-based service-line strategy
  • Using expensive medical equipment purchases to encourage physician referrals
  • Attracting patients with new construction in support of market share growth
  • Short-term acute hospitals focus on profitable service lines such as oncology, cardiology, neurology, and orthopedics.

Specific examples of this growth are abundant.  In Indianapolis, all four of their hospital systems built coronary surgery centers at a combined cost of $210 million.  A community hospital 15 miles north of the city opened a smaller, open-heart surgery program.  In Cincinnati, nine hospitals performed open heart surgery. Eight Boston Hospitals Have da Vinci System, which may indicate that robotic surgery may be used for marketing purposes.

However,  health reform has started to change these trends.  Medicare is instituting more bundled payment (e.g., dialysis payments)  rather than pure fee-for-service.  Further, Medicare’s Shared Savings Program (MSSP)  aims to use Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) to coordinate patient care improve quality and reduce the rate of growth in health care spending.

How will hospitals respond to the changing market landscape?  One way hospitals can improve their margins is to only treat healthier patients to improve their performance in the case where risk adjustment methods are imprecise.  Also, provider mergers may be a trend. Access larger populations will lessen risk providers must bear under new payment models.  Larger size also means that hospitals can negotiate better rates with suppliers.  Hospitals will likely sell redundant or non-core assets.

Hospitals will also adopt new technology to better manage care. For instance, Henry Ford Health System in Detroit uses an embedded specialized software called RadPort in its electronic physician order entry system that prompts physicians to enter specific information when ordering radiology tests.  The pilot, funded with a CMS grant, will see whether these prompts will reduce utilization levels.

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Health Reform’s Accountable Care Act (ACA) mandates the creation of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs).  Dartmouth researcher Elliott Fisher stimulating much of the interest in ACOs by introducing the concept of an “extended hospital medical staff” at a 2006 meeting of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC).

Today, I review an article by Berenson and Burton (2011) describing the latest ACO developments.

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Starting in fiscal year 2014, Medicare will start rewarding hospitals with high quality care and penalizing hospitals with low quality care.  The rewards and penalties will be financial in nature. High-quality hospitals will receive a bonus and low-quality hospitals will receive a financial penalty.  There is a lot of existing documentation on this hospital value-based purchasing (HVBP) program such as:

One component of the HVBP is patient satisfaction.  Some policy experts believe that patient satisfaction is of the utmost importance.  If Medicare evaluates hospitals based on patient satisfaction, then hospitals will compete to improve how well patients are satisfied. A New York Times article already mentions some of the efforts hospitals are undertaking to improve patient satisfaction.  For example,

  • Improving the quality of food
  • Renovating units
  • Creating more single units (compared to shared units)
  • Having nurses visit rooms hourly
  • Creating scripts for doctor-patient and nurse-patient interactions
  • Quicker response time ["Jefferson Regional Medical Center in Pittsburgh expects all employees, from maintenance workers to doctors, to respond to a patient’s call light or find someone to offer assistance."]
  • Building more elevators.

Elevators!?!?!  It turns out that “NYU found that long waits at its elevators drove down its scores, so now it is building a new bank of elevators.”

Hospitals complain, however, that they may only have a limited ability to influence ratings.  This is certainly true in some cases. For instance, patient expectations of the standard of care they receive may vary regionally.  For example,

…some of the nation’s most prestigious hospitals, including Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles and the University of Chicago Medical Center, get lower marks from patients on most areas of patient experiences, according to the government’s Hospital Compare Web site.

So do many of New York City’s elite institutions…Some hospitals, like NYU, get bad patient reviews even as they score average or superior in measures of clinical care from the government and accreditation groups.

‘People in New York have very high expectations about what it means to be taken care of,’ said Dr. Katherine Hochman, an NYU physician. ‘When they don’t get their food on time and have to spend eight hours in the emergency department, well, that’s just not their image of what a world-class institution is.’

Further, many providers believe that indigent patients give physicians lower quality scores even though these patients receive the same care as do richer patients.  Hospitals with more Medicaid-eligible patients could receive lower patient satisfaction scores due to case mix alone rather than due to actual quality.

To account for these confounding factors, Medicare can institute a risk adjustment mechanism.  By including patient income (or Medicaid) status in their model, however, Medicare would implicitly be allowing hospitals to provide a lower standard of care to the poor. Alternatively, if the poor do in fact give lower satisfaction scores, than hospitals may have an incentive to avoid these patients.

Similarly, including regional indicators in the risk adjustment model can also be problematic.  If New Yorkers have higher standards than individuals from Iowa, then one may want to normalize performance regional.  If CMS adopts this specifications, hospitals in essence would only be compared against their local peers.  Areas which have consistently below average care–in terms of patient satisfaction–may not be punished if they are the ‘best of the worst’ in their area.

Although patient satisfaction is not always correlated with high quality medical care, paying hospitals more for care that meets their patients’ needs does seem to be a sensible solution.

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