Labor Economics

You are currently browsing the archive for the Labor Economics category.

A recent JHE article by Park and Kang wonder if more education induces people to have a healthier lifestyle.  They use data on Korean men to see if this is the case.  They find that “an increase in education induces individuals to exercise regularly, and to get regular health checkups…[but]…education has little effect on smoking or drinking.”

Tags: , , , ,

Many economists have noted that wage growth has not kept up with overall economic growth over the past few decades.  We observe widening wage inequality since the 1970s.  Are workers getting poorer relative to the owners of capital?  Is a communist revolution needed to equalize the playing field?

Economist Martin Feldstein thinks not.  

Feldstein concludes that…measurement mistakes have led some analysts to conclude that the rise in labor income has not kept up with the growth in productivity. The first is a focus on wages rather than total compensation: because of the rise in fringe benefits and other non-cash payments [such as health insurance], wages have not risen as rapidly as total compensation. Feldstein feels it is important to compare the productivity rise with the increase in total compensation rather than the increase in the narrower measure of just wages and salaries.

Since health insurance costs have been increasing more than inflation over time, overall employee compensation has risen at about historical rates.  Of the compensation workers receive, however, a larger and larger percentage is going towards health insurance.  This is especially true for low income workers. This is a point I made in a post in January 2007.

Tags: , , ,

In recent years, economists have examined the phenomenon of offshoring.  Offshorable service jobs are characterized by a number of factors.   Jensen and Kletzer note that offshorable jobs have little face-to-face customer contact and work processes that can be monitored via the internet.  Thus, data entry is easily offshorable whereas barbershop services are not.

A paper by Alan Blinder reveals a troubling observation: economists are easily offshorable!  The occupation of “Economist” had an offshoreablitily index of 89%.  This ranks economists as the 37th most offshorable profession of the 291 occupations studied.  A presentation by Lori Kletzer at the UC Labor Economics workshop claimed that economists are the 15th most offshorable profession of the 457.

Why are economists so offshorable?  Economists write frequently, conduct data analysis and think a lot.  All of these tasks can be done anywhere in the world (assuming you have a laptop and an internet connection).  Looks like American economists aren’t indispensible after all.

Tags: ,

The WSJ Real Time Economics blog reviews a paper by Michael Lechner which finds that “sports-playing adults saw a boost in income of about 1,200 euros per year over 16 years when compared to their less active peers. That translates into a 5-10% rate of return on sports activities, roughly equal to the benefit of an extra year’s worth of education.” How can playing sports increase income?

The simplest mechanism is that playing sports increases one’s health level. Healthier people are less likely to get sick and more likely to be able to work to earn income. This health difference, however, only explains a portion of the income differential. Dr. Lechner claims that playing sports builds a social network which helps to increase pay (e.g., your friends are the ones who recommend you for jobs). In fact, Lechner finds that sports-playing men display a higher level of “social functioning” than did the less active men.

One worry of this study is that of reverse causation. If someone is very sick, they are not able to play sports. Further, if you are sick, you are probably less likely to engage in social activities. Thus, health–and not sports playing–may be a hidden, unobserved feature which may be driving these results.

Tags: , ,

Nobel laureate James Heckman has a nice summary of how applied econometricians and policy researchers should define causality. Some of the more interesting points I have excerpted below.

On the source of randomness in a sample

One reason why many statistical models are incomplete is that they do not specify the sources of randomness generating variability among agents, i.e., they do not specify why otherwise observationally identical people make different choices and have different outcomes given the same choice. They do not distinguish what is in the agent’s information set from what is in the observing statistician’s information set, although the distinction is fundamental in justifying the properties of any estimator for solving selection and evaluation problems. They do not distinguish uncertainty from the point of view of the agent whose behavior is being analyzed from variability as analyzed by the observing analyst. They are also incomplete because they are recursive. They do not allow for simultaneity in choices of outcomes of treatment that are at the heart of game theory and models of social interactions and contagion (see, e.g., Brock & Durlauf, 2001; Tamer, 2003).

Unbundling a treatment

Researchers often say that a policy change will cause a change in some outcome measure. However, a policy change is often made up of many components. Which components of the policy change actually influenced the outcomes? In Heckman’s words:

Many causal models in statistics are black-box devices designed to investigate the impact of “treatments”—often complex packages of interventions—on observed outcomes in a given environment. Unbundling the components of complex treatments is rarely done. Explicit scientific models go into the black box to explore the mechanism(s) producing the effects.

Outcomes vs. Utilities

Most researchers pick an outcome variable of interest and if the outcome increases–assuming a beneficial outcome measure–than people are better off. This may not be the case however. For instance, Bill Clinton’s welfare reform act (PRWORA) may have increased employment rates and income for single mothers, but the mother’s utility may have decreased. The single mothers may (or may not) have valued spending time caring for their child more than working.

Problems with non-linearity

Issues such as “social interactions, contagion and general equilibrium effects” can complicate causal inference.

What are you measuring?

Let us assume that Y is the outcome variable of interest. Y depends on what state, s, you are in. For instance, in a treatment/no treatment world, Y(s) is the outcome if you would be treated and Y(s’) is the effect if you were not treated. D(s)=1 if you were actually treated and D(s)=0 if you did not receive treatment in the data. Thus, we can measure various things:

  • Average Treatment Effect (ATE): E (Y s) − Y(s’)). This is equal to the average effect if all individuals moved from a untreated to a treated state.
  • Treatment on the Treated (TT): E[(Y(s) − Y(s')) | D(s) = 1]. This looks at the average effect of treatment only on those who were treated. This is important if only certain individual select into the treatment group, or if the policy change is only relevant for certain individuals.
  • Treatment on the Untreated (TUT): E[(Y(s) − Y(s')) | D(s) = 0]. It is also possible that treatment can affect those who are not treated. For instance, instituting a work training program for treated individuals may reduce community college enrollment and thus may affect untreated individuals (e.g., if the community college closes from lack of enrollment).
  • Policy relevant treatment effect (PRTE):Ep[Y(s)] − Ep’ [Y(s)]. The estimator compares the average outcomes of two different policy choices.

Heckman, James (2008) “Economic Causality” NBER WP #13934.

Tags: , , ,

Economists predict that longer life expectancy leads to more investment in education. For those who live a short time, sacrificing working years for education is not worthwhile if the payback period is short. For those with a longer life expectancy, an individual can reap the monetary rewards from education over a longer period of time.

An NBER working paper by Seema Jayachandran looks at a what happens to educational investment after there was a 70% reduction in maternal mortality risk in Sri Lanka. The decreased maternal mortality rate was due to a number of factors: an increase in the number of hospitals, clinics and health centers, an increase in the number of trained birth attendants, transportation improvements such as free ambulances, and increased adoption of western technologies such as sulfa drugs and penicillin. Further, there was significant success in eradicating malaria during this time. Also, most of the medical services were provided for free.

Jayachandran uses a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) strategy. “The first difference is over time, since maternal mortality fell between 1946 and 1953. The second difference is across geographic areas; the magnitude of the MMR declines varied considerably across Sri Lanka’s 19 districts. The third difference is between genders; maternal mortality is quite unique among major causes of death in that it exclusively pertains to women.”

The results of the study are that the decline in “…maternal mortality risk over the sample period increased female life expectancy at age 15 by 4.1%, female literacy by 2.5%, and female years of education by 4.0%.”

  • Seema Jayachandran (2008) “Life Expectancy and Human Capital Investments: Evidence From Maternal Mortality Declines” NBER WP #13947.

Tags: , ,

Should employers provide health insurance to their employees? There are many reasons why they should. One is that employees are attracted to firms that offer health insurance, especially since their are tax and cost advantages to group health insurance purchased through an employer. Another reason is that if a worker becomes sick, that reduces productivity. But how much does it cost a firm when either 1) a worker is absent from work (absenteeism) or 2) the worker shows up for work but their productivity is impaired (presenteeism)?

A paper by Pauly et al. (2008) attempts to quantify these costs. Unlike most studies, they use manager estimates of lost productivity. While workers may have better information regarding how much productivity is lost during an illness, workers may have an incentive to answer strategically and further, managers will be the ones ultimately deciding how much health care preventing employee illness is truly worth.

The authors hypothesize that jobs with the following three characteristics will be more affected when a worker becomes ill:

  • jobs with high values of team production,
  • jobs with high requirements for timely output, and
  • jobs with high difficulties of substitution for absent or impaired workers.

A firm of course, can invest in protection measures in the case of illness. For instance, it could cross-train workers, it could accumulate inventory to smooth out periods of down time, or might pay workers to work harder if an employee is missing. Nevertheless, the authors estimate the costs of absenteeism as follows:

Job Type Absence multipliers
Auto Service technician 1.05
Hotel maids 1.05
Customer Service Reps 1.10
Waiters 1.10
Automobile Sales 1.10
MD office receptionists 1.10
Medical Assistants 1.20
Team Assemblers 1.25
Hotel Desk Clerks 1.25
Legal Secretaries 1.27
Construction Workers 1.35
Cooks 1.36
Truck Drivers 1.50
RNs 1.52
Retail Sales 1.60
Paralegals 2.00
Carpenters 2.00
Engineers 2.04

The authors assume that the cost of being absent must be at least the employees wage if the labor market is competitive. We see that the cost of an illness is significantly higher than the wage. Also, jobs that were found to involve more teamwork, had times sensitive products, and for which workers were not substitutable had larger absentee multipliers.

For workers who are sick, but come to work, here is the cost to the firm as a percentage of the employees wage.

Job Type Acute % Chronic %
Auto Service technician 12.5% 12.5%
Hotel maids 12.5% 12.5%
Customer Service Reps 25.0% 15.8%
Waiters 25.0% 20.1%
Automobile Sales 16.1% 12.5%
MD office receptionists 25.0% 25.0%
Medical Assistants 25.0% 25.0%
Team Assemblers 30.0% 38.8%
Hotel Desk Clerks 25.0% 25.0%
Legal Secretaries 25.0% 35.7%
Construction Workers 25.0% 25.0%
Cooks 25.0% 25.0%
Truck Drivers 25.0% 25.0%
RNs 37.5% 37.5%
Retail Sales 37.5% 37.5%
Paralegals 56.4% 75.0%
Carpenters 50.0% 55.1%
Engineers 75.0% 75.0%

One problem with this analysis is that it assumes that this is a one-time illness. If these are long term illnesses, it may be more cost effective for the firm to fire the employee because their sickness is either 1) driving up insurance premiums or 2) causing them to miss too much work. Offering a generous health insurance benefit may help to prevent illness, but may also attract sicker people to the firm. Thus, despite the article’s demonstration that the cost of employees missing work is significantly higher than their wage and that there are large costs when workers come to work when they are sick, it still does not mean that employers will want to offer generous health plans.

  • MV Pauly, S Nicholson, D Polsky, ML Berger, C Sharda (2008). “Valuing Reductions in On-the-job Illness: ‘Presenteeism’ from Managerial and Economic Perspectives.” Health Economics, vol. 17(4): 469-485.

Tags: , ,

Paul Levy, the president and CEO of Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center in Boston made about $1 million dollars in 2005. Of this, $650,000 was base salary, $195,000 was made up of incentive bonus, and the balance was composed of compensation for health insurance, life insurance, and retirement.
How do I know these figures? Paul Levy told me. Well, he didn’t tell me directly, but he did post these figures on his Running a Hospital blog. Levy writes:
So, if you were on my board, how would you set an appropriate salary? You might look at the competition, and as the Globe notes, the salaries for most of the Boston-area hospital CEOs center around the same level. Would you look at salaries of people in for-profit companies, and, if so, how do you measure comparable size and complexity? Would you look at salaries of other types of non-profits, like universities and museums?

Does it matter that the average tenure of a hospital CEO is under six years? If that is roughly the tenure of a major league baseball player, should CEO salaries be in the same ballpark? Sorry, I couldn’t resist!

The New York Times recently posted an interactive page on executive pay. So the question remains, readers, how would you set Paul Levy’s salary?

Tags: , ,

Gruber (1994) shows that the costs of employer-provided health insurance benefits are passed on to employees through lower wages. But do employees with higher expected medical expenses have their wages reduced by a higher amount to reflect the additional medical costs to employers? This may not be the case if employers can not observe the health of employees when they hire them. On the other hand, for obese individuals, the fact that they are obese is easily observable. Papers such as Finkelstein, Fiebelkorn and Wang (2003) show that annual medical expenditures for obese individuals are $732 more than those of normal weight. Is this additional cost passed on to obese employees through lower wages?

This is what an NBER working paper by Bhattacharya and Bundorf (2005) aims to investigate. The authors compare the wages of obese and non-obese individuals in companies without health insurance. Then they compare the differences in wages of obese and non-obese employees in companies with health insurance. Since no health insurance costs will be passed on employees if no insurance is offered, the difference between the two wage gaps may be able to identify if higher health insurance premiums are passed on to employees through lower wages. If there are differences in wages between obese and non-obese workers (i.e.: due to discrimination, lower productivity, etc.) these differences are likely constant across firms with and without health insurance.

The authors find that “the incidence of obesity on wages for workers insured through their employers is -$1.68.” After controlling for a variety of covariates, this estimate lowers to -$1.44. This difference is mostly due to the fact that wages of obese workers with health insurance grew slower than thinner workers with health insurance. This may be due to the increasing price of medical care, the increasing severity of obesity–the BMI of individuals at the 95th body weight percentile has increased over time–or the aging of the population in the panel.

As a falsification test, the authors use a similar difference-in-difference estimation strategy comparing the obese vs. non-obese wage gap between employers with and without other fringe benefits (e.g.: life insurance, dental insurance, retirement benefits, child care, maternity leave, etc.). If obesity does not affect the cost of these fringe benefits, than we should see no difference in the obese/non-obese wage gap between employers who do and do not offer these benefits. The authors find that this difference-in-difference estimator is not statistically different from zero.

There are a few problems with this analysis. First the authors admit that “those with relatively low productivity due to health consequences of obesity may consume more medical care and, as a result, self select into firms offering health insurance.” Also, the data the authors have only reveals whether or not the individual has health insurance, and does not give the insurance premium paid by either the employer or the employee. Thus, these estimates are likely to be very imprecise.

Nevertheless, if this study’s results are true, then it would imply the following:

“If there are no externalities in these decisions, then “twinkie” taxes will only distort already optimal decisions. But if employer-provided insurance pools the health risk of the obese and non-obese, it will create an externality that reduces incentives to maintain a normal weight. Our evidence on the incidence of the obesity wage premium suggests that pooling of the obese and non-obese does not occur in the employer-sponsored insurance market; hence the externalities caused by health insurance on decisions about body weight are small.

Tags: , ,

Are smart people risk averse? Are dumb people impatient?

This is what Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, David Huffman, Uwe Sunde explore in their 2007 Discussion paper. Using data from a choice experiment of 1000 German adults, the authors tested for risk aversion using a Holt & Laury framework, and for impatience by varying the annual rate of return for a €100 investment. It is necessary to test the risk aversion and impatience parameter separately because in expected utility theory (EUT), a more concave utility function will cause more impatient choices, holding constant the discount rate. Cognitive ability was measured using questions similar to those on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS).

The authors found that individuals with higher cognitive abilities are less likely to be risk averse. Further, those who scored higher on the WAIS are significantly less impatient. This finding is true even after controlling for income, education, and credit constraint co-variates.

According to the authors:

“The paper also points to a different interpretation of reduced form models that have been estimated in the literature on cognitive ability and labor market outcomes. These models have typically included a measure of cognitive abilities, but not risk aversion or impatience, as explanatory variables (e.g., Cawley et al., 2001). Outcomes such as educational attainment or wages may by affected by risk aversion and impatience, and thus part of the impact of cognitive ability may reflect the correlation with these traits. In other words, our findings point to a potentially important source of omitted variable bias in this type of estimation.

Given that cognitive ability is known to be transmitted from parents to children, our findings could also be relevant for the literature on intergenerational transmission of preferences and socio-economic status.”

Tags: ,

« Older entries § Newer entries »