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Will competitive bidding work in Medicare?

February 9, 2012 in Medicare | No comments

In my opinion the answer is yes.  A book by Coulam, Feldman and Dowd also would agree with me.

Recently, Medicare began a competitive bidding process for durable medical equipment.  Is it working?  According to the Wall Street Journal, the answer is no.

“Normally when the government wants to buy something, it asks companies how much they can provide and to name their price. Winners are selected from the lowest bid up until the government has what it needs at the lowest possible cost, and thereby finds competitive equilibrium prices.

Under Medicare’s highly unusual version of competitive bidding, it will pay the winners the median price of all the winning bids, rather than using the clearing price. Bids are also for some reason nonbinding.

This matters because it creates incentives for unscrupulous third-party companies to make low-ball “suicide bids.” If the median price shakes out high enough, they automatically win the contract, buy the medical products from manufacturers and turn a profit. If it isn’t, they can dump the contract since bidding involves no commitment.”

I still think competitive bidding in Medicare will work; the auctions just have to be set up in a more logical way.

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How much is rent in your area?

February 1, 2012 in Data, Medicare, Physician Compensation | No comments

The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) is responsible for answering just that question.  To determine what level Section 8 vouchers should be set, HUD measures the rents for every county across the nation.  Specifically, they measure the 40th percentile and 50th percentile (i.e., median) rents in each area.  They choose to use the median so that high prices for luxury residences do not skew the measure of rent for a “typical” person in each area.  How does HUD calculate these Fair Market Rents (FMR)?  Today I will explain.

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Medicare Payments for Hospitals in Under-served Areas

January 23, 2012 in Hospitals, Medicare | No comments

One of the goals of Medicare is to provide its beneficiaries access to quality care regardless of where they live.  Thus, the Medicare program provides financial incentives to providers located in these remote areas.

Whereas most Medicare pays most hospitals through the inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS), it pays certain rural hospitals based on their reported costs.  Medicare pays Critical Access Hospitals (CAH), for instance, 101 percent of its report cost for inpatient, outpatient, laboratory, and therapy services.  It also pays this providers 101 percent of their cost for post-acute care for CAH beds are “swing beds” (which are beds that can be used for either acute or post-acute care).

However, how should Medicare define ‘critical’? The simplest definition is just whether a hospital is in a rural (i.e., non-metropolitan) area. However, there are various gradations of ‘rural’. A rural hospital on the outskirts of a big city would be far less ‘critical’ then one very far from distant areas. One could define ‘critical’ based on facility volume. If the low volume is due to poor quality, however, defining these hospitals as critical could just reward poor hospitals. Third, could define a hospital as isolated based on its distance from other facilities who could provide comparable care. Alternatively, one could identify critical hospitals based on demographic factors such as population density in the surrounding areas.

Below, I provide more information on other types of types of rural hospital designations in Medicare.
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Medicare reducing reimbursement for low-quality docs

January 16, 2012 in Medicare, P4P, Physician Compensation | 4 comments

In 2015, Medicare will begin implementing a value-based purchasing (VPB) program for physicians.  Initially the program will target only certain physicians and groups of physicians, but by 2017 all physicians is participate in this program.

The VBP program will evaluate physicians along two broad dimensions: quality and cost.  In the final rule:

Section 1848(p) of the Act requires the Secretary to ‘‘establish a payment modifier that provides for differential payment to a physician or a group of physicians’’ under the physician fee schedule ‘‘based upon the quality of care furnished compared to cost *** during a performance period.’’ The provision requires that ‘‘such payment modifier be separate from the geographic adjustment factors’’ established for the physician fee schedule. In addition, section 1848(p)(4)(C) of the Act requires that the value modifier be implemented in a budget-neutral manner.

 

Quality

The current quality measures to be used include:

  1. The measures in the core set of the Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS);
  2. All measures in the Group Practice Reporting Option (GPRO) of the Physician Quality Reporting System; and
  3. the core measures, alternate core, and 38 additional measures in the Electronic Health Records (EHR) Incentive Program measures.

Cost

The current measures of cost CMS is using are total per capita cost measures and per capita cost measures for beneficiaries with four chronic conditions (COPD; heart failure; coronary artery disease; and diabetes).

By January 2012, however, CMS will choose an episode grouper which can evaluate physicians based on episodes of care. Specifically:

Section 1848(n)(9)(A) of the Act requires us to develop by January 1, 2012, an episode grouper that combines separate, but clinically related items and services into an episode of care for an
individual, as appropriate.

Other Issues

One of the main problems of the physician VBP is attribution of patients to doctors. In managed care organizations, patients are assigned a primary care doctor or gatekeeper who are responsible for the patient’s overall care. In Medicare, the patient can see any willing provider; because the primary care doctor cannot restrict the patient’s choice of care, it is more difficult to hold them responsible for the care. Specifically, Medicare beneficiaries never have to choose a primary care doctor, so identifying the doctor to be ultimately responsible for each patient’s overall care is difficult.

Physicians require additional information to understand why the received the VBP scores they did. For this purpose, CMS will create Physician Feedback Reports, confidential reports providing more detailed information of the underlying factors which produce these scores.

For the VBP modifier in 2015, CMS will use 2013 as the initial performance period 2013. This means that payment adjustments in 2015 will be on care provided 2 years ago. Although evaluating physician performance, allowing for appeals and adjusting payments takes time; two years is a long lead time.

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Why Doctors Don’t Like Medicare

January 3, 2012 in Medicare, Physician Compensation | 7 comments

Being a doctor is difficult.  You need to graduate from medical school and learn a ton of difficult scientific concepts.  You need to stay up to date on the latest medical developments.  You need to cater to sick, needy patients (and their family).  Any you need to get paid.

Earning a living is not as simple for doctors as other professions.  Sure doctors make a lot of money.  But knowing how much they get paid for a particular service is complex.

I provide an overview of the physician reimbursement system here.  That overview does not take into account all the payment modifiers in the Medicare’s physician reimbursement system.  Consider the following payment modifiers:

  • For many procedures, Medicare pays providers for the professional and technical component.  The professional component is the physician’s work and expertise; the technical component provides reimbursement for equipment and supplemental staff needed to perform the procedure.  If the procedure is billed globally, then the physician receives both components.  If another entity performed the technical component, then the physician is only paid for the professional component.  For instance, for lab tests, the lab may run the test (technical component) but the physician would be the one interpreting the test (professional component).
  • If you assist in a surgery, you receive 16% of the fee the primary surgeon does.Under some circumstances, the individual skills of two surgeons are required to perform surgery on the same patient during the same operative session.  If you are a co-surgeon (rather than an assistant at surgery), you receive 62.5% of the typical reimbursement for that surgery.
  • If you perform a bilateral surgery–a surgery done on both sides of the body (e.g., right arm and left arm)–then you receive 150% of the payment you would have received from doing a unilateral surgery.
  • When multiple procedures are performed through the same endoscope, payment will be made for the highest valued endoscopy (100% of the allowance) plus the difference between the next highest and the base endoscopy.
  • If you perform multiple surgeries in the same day on the same patient, you do not get paid the same amount as if these were performed on multiple days.  The highest valued procedure is paid 100% of the allowance.  For the second through the fifth highest valued procedures, the physician receives 50% of the typical payment amount.
  • If you are a physician assistant, nurse practitioner, or a registered dietitian or nutritionists; you receive 85% of the payment an MD would receive for performing the same service.
  • If you are a clinical social worker, you receive 75% of the payment an MD would receive for performing the same service.
  • If you are a certified nurse midwife, you recieve 85% of the payment an MD would receive for performing the same service.  If you are a midwife, you only receive 65%.

If you don’t think Medicare is bureaucratic, just take a look at those rules.

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Doc Fix Fixed…for Two Months

January 2, 2012 in Medicare, Physician Compensation | No comments

Kaiser Health News reports:
The House GOP leadership’s agreement to a Senate proposal averts a 27 percent paycut to doctors scheduled to take effect in January. The deal delays the cut until March 1, and lawmakers hope to hammer out an agreement on a longer-term fix to the payment formula before then.

As I previously noted, this delaying the cut to physician payment is not a long term fix. Either Medicare should remove the sustainable growth rate (SGR) provision and acknowledge the fiscal impact of paying doctors more or they should impose the SGR or (more likely) a modified SGR.

The current two month delay makes it seem as if Congress will cut Medicare payments to physicians by 27 percent on March 1, 2012, even though this will of course not happen.

With respect to the ‘doc fix’ issue, more transparency is needed.

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Will the Doc Fix happen this year?

December 26, 2011 in Medicare, Physician Compensation | 1 comment

The Healthcare Economist is going on vacation for the next week.

In the meantime, I pose to you, my reader, a bet.  Do you think the ‘doc fix’ gets passed?  Before you read on, make your predictions in the comments section below.

Healthcare Economist’s Prediction

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Bring Market Prices to Medicare

December 16, 2011 in Books, Health Insurance, Managed Care, Medicare, Medicare Advantage | 4 comments

Medicare is a government-run insurance program.  Can policy changes be made to add competition to Medicare, maintain quality and reduce cost?  A book titled Bring Market Prices to Medicare argues that it can through a competitive bidding process. This book makes a number of sensible arguments which I review today.

The main proposal of the book is a competitive bidding process for all Medicare plans. Currently, there is a form of competitive bidding only for Medicare Advantage (MA) managed care plans. The authors also argues for competitive bidding for fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare (i.e., Parts A and B).  There is already a competitive bidding process for Medicare’s prescription drug program (Part D) which has worked well.

One of the main advantages of Medicare FFS is that beneficiaries do not need a referral for any services and are not limited to certain provider networks. However, Medicare beneficiaries do not pay for these added benefits. In addition, even if HMOs are more efficient than Medicare FFS, Medicare FFS beneficiaries still pay the same Part B premiums.

The authors want beneficiaries to face the true price differentials between the lowest cost plans and less efficient plans., regardless if the plan is Medicare FFS or an MA plan. Thus, beneficiaries would be responsible for any premium differences due to choosing a more expensive plan.

Currently, MA plans receive a variant of the average bid in their service area. The authors propose that Medicare would only pay for the lowest cost plan. This proposal would in essence be a transfer from plans and beneficiaries (who would have to pay the cost differential between the plan they choose and the lowest cost plan) to the government. Given the fiscal hole the federal government is facing, this is a good idea.

Authors also propose to eliminate the 25% tax on premiums. According to MedPAC, “Plans that bid below the benchmark also receive payment from Medicare in the form of a “rebate.” The law defines the rebate as 75 percent of the difference between the plan’s actual bid (not standardized) and its case mix-adjusted benchmark. The plan must then return the rebate to its enrollees in the form of supplemental benefits or lower premiums” The rebate structure gives plans a disincentive from lowering their bids since they only recover a share of the cost decreases.

Another issue focuses on regional adjustments. Living in New York is expensive and health care is more expensive in New York than in rural Mississippi. However, should Medicare subsidize New Yorkers because their health care is more expensive. The authors argue no, but poor individuals in high cost areas will be adversely affected by this policy choice.

A major issue is controlling quality. Plans could create low cost plans by providing low-quality care or failing to provide mandated services. Thus, CMS will need to regulate the plans. Plans with quality levels below a specific level would be barred from enrolling individuals or the government could force beneficiaries to pay additional premiums to enroll in these low quality plans. Public reporting of plan quality is also needed.

Strategic bidding is also a problem. Plans could collude to raise the bid price. However, by having Medicare FFS as an option will cap the amount colluding firms could increase prices. Further, a small firm could bid a very low amount and set the market. Medicare could set the benchmark at the lowest cost plan which meets a minimum size requirement.

Source:

Another Review of the Book:

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What’s a ‘dual’?

December 15, 2011 in Medicaid, Medicaid/Medicare, Medicare | No comments

Nine million individuals qualify for both Medicare and Medicaid health insurance.  These individuals, known as dual-eligibles, rank among the most expensive Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.  Duals are frequently hospitalized and often need long-term care.  In fact, most state spending for dual eligibles focuses on long-term care supports and services.

The federal government pays the bulk of care costs for dual eligibles. Of the $319.5 billion estimated as spent on duals in 2011, 80 percent ($256.6 billion) are federal dollars, more than two-thirds of which flowed through Medicare.

Unnecessary hospital use is one of the main drivers of inflated Medicare spending on duals.  One reason for this is that Medicare pays for all hospitalizations.  Thus, State Medicaid Agencies have less of an incentive to prevent costly hospitalizations.  Further, nursing homes also have an incentive to hospitalize duals.  Nursing home who care for an individual after they are hospitalized receive a higher Medicare skilled nursing facility (SNF) rates rather than the lower Medicaid long-term care rates.  Thus, nursing homes can increase their rates just by admitting their residents to teh hospital periodically.

Additionally: Dual eligibles experience far higher rates of “potentially preventable hospital admissions” than other Medicare beneficiaries: more than twice as high for pressure ulcers, asthma and diabetes; 52 percent higher for urinary tract infection; and over 30 percent higher for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and bacterial pneumonia.

Many dual eligible individuals are enrolled in Medicare Special Needs Plans (SNP).  [Dual eligibles constitute about a million of the 1.3 million people enrolled in SNPs.]  Medicare pays these pays a capitated rate in exchange for providing a host of services to these beneficiaries.

The Affordable Care Act established of the Medicare-Medicaid Coordinated Care Office (known internally at CMS as the Office of the Duals), which has launched a number of initiatives to better align the programs.  A paper by Feder et al. makes the following recommendations:

  1. finance nurse practitioners in nursing homes to coordinate frail residents’ care (United Healthcare’s Evercare program has already demonstrated, relative to control groups, that this strategy can cut hospitalizations and emergency room use in half);
  2. apply performance standards, like those now applied to hospitals, to penalize SNFs with excessive rates of preventable hospitalizations for their residents (whether or not they are receiving SNF care).

Source:

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Is Medicare moving towards rationing your medical equipment?

December 13, 2011 in Fraud, Medicaid/Medicare, Medicare | No comments

Currently, Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries receive significantly more choice than standard commercial plans.  They can choose any provider they wish (who accepts Medicare).  There are no cost-sharing differences between in-network and out-of-network doctors (because there is no ‘in-network’ for Medicare).  Although certain Part D prescription drug plans require prior authorization for specific drugs, few services (if any) currently require the beneficiary to receive prior authorization to be covered for a specific service.

Prior Authorization, however, may be on the way.  A demonstration for all Medicare beneficiaries who reside in seven states with high populations of fraud- and error-prone providers will have to secure prior authorization for certain medical equipment. The states participating in the demonstration include California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New York, North Carolina and Texas.

Some people will claim that prior authorization is rationing.  This is 100% true.  That doesn’t mean that it is a bad thing or anti-capitalist.  Commercial plans, particularly HMOs, often require prior authorization for certain services.  Further, the prior authorization can decrease fraud.  For example,

“…some suppliers of medical equipment try to cheat Medicare by offering expensive powerwheelchairs and scooters to people who don’t qualify for these items. Also, some suppliers of medical equipment may call you without your permission, even though ‘cold calling’ isn’t allowed.”

With Medicare costs climbing at a rapid, unsustainable pace, I see prior authorization in Medicare as one way to slow the growth of medical spending–particularly unnecessary medical spending. The question remains, although failing to implement prior authorization would create additional fiscal pressures, I am not sure if these types of measures are feasible politically.  Especially in a “Keep your government hands off my Medicare” environment.

 

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