Quality

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Measuring Hospital Efficiency

May 20, 2012 in Hospitals, Medicare, P4P, Quality | No comments

Medicare recently released the Medicare Spending per Beneficiary (MSPB) measure on Hospital Compare. This measure includes all payments to doctors, hospitals or other facilities for services provided to a patient during the three days before the hospital stay, during the stay, and during the 30 days after discharge from the hospital. Kaiser Health news provides an analysis of this measure and also provides an interactive graph of state level efficiency and a list of hospital MSPB scores.

The Kaiser Health News article notes that:

“Patients treated at most or all hospitals in Las Vegas, Fort Lauderdale, Newark, Miami, Los Angeles and Orange County, Calif., tended to cost more than the national median, which is $17,988. Patients treated at most or all hospitals in Anchorage, Des Moines, Honolulu, Minneapolis and Portland, Ore., tended to cost Medicare less.”

The article also recaps the opinions of a number of industry and policy thought leaders.

Jennifer Faerberg, director of health care affairs at the Association of American Medical Colleges stated that differences in the MSPB measure across hospitals is primary due to how well hospitals  can control post-acute costs.  This is generally true. The MSPB measure controls for the type of admission (i.e., MS-DRG) of the index admission.  Thus, differences in the MSPB measure are due principally to differences in post-acute spending and the frequency with which the patient is readmitted to the hospital within the 30 days after the initial hospitalization.

Some policy experts were critical of the MSPB measure:

Nancy Foster, a vice president at the American Hospital Association, said the data do not answer key questions: Did the patients that got more services fare better than others? Could the patients that cost Medicare less actually have benefitted from more care? ”What we don’t know is if those additional investments yield differences in outcomes,” Foster said.

Foster makes a good point; the MSPB measure should not be analyzed in isolation.  CMS does not only measures hospital efficiency, but also includes a number of hospital quality measures.

Elliott Fisher, one of the main researchers from the Dartmouth Atlas, questioned the practical usefulness of the new information.  “As a hospital administrator I would go, how does this help me?” he said. “We just don’t know whether a lot of specialists are running through the hospital doing everything they can to every patient who is horizontal, or whether they’re discharging every patient to a rehab facility. Those are two very different causes of high costs.”

However, CMS did distribute a “hospital specific report” that detailed where the average spending went (e.g., inpatient, skilled nursing facility, home health physician) in the periods before, during and after the index hospital admission.  Each of these quantities is compared to the state and national average spending levels for each type of service.

Disclaimer: The Healthcare Economist worked with CMS and a team at Acumen to develop the MSPB measure.

 

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Does Public Reporting Affect Patient Behavior?

May 7, 2012 in Nursing Home, Nursing Homes, Quality | No comments

A number of studies have already examined this question.

  • Baker et al. (2003) examined the effectiveness of a public reporting effort in hospitals in Ohio, finding little relationship between a hospital’s report card ranking and changes in its market share.
  • Cutler et al. (2004) examined the effects of reporting quality information about cardiac surgery on hospital volume, finding that being identified as a high-mortality hospital was associated with a decline in the number of cardiac surgery patients at that hospital in the period following the designation.
  • Dafny and Dranove (2008) examine the influence of Medicare HMO report cards…showing that highly ranked plans were gaining market share prior to the report cards’ release but that the report cards led to further gains in market share for high-scoring plans.
  • Chernew et al. (2008) use a Bayesian learning model to estimate enrollees’ general assessment of plan quality prior to the release of report cards and the changes in these assessments over time. They find that the addition of publicly reported plan information has a small incremental effect.

A more recent study by Werner et al. (2012) examines whether Medicare’s Nursing Home Compare website affects consumer decisions. Nursing Home Compare evaluates nursing homes using a variety of factors including: 1) whether they passed inspections, 2) structural measures such as staffing ratios, 3) quality measures reported on MDS assessments.

The authors find “a very small (though statistically significant) demand response to public reporting.”  Skilled nursing facility (SNF) market share experienced a 0.1% increase in market share in cases where the facility increased its reported quality of treating patient pain from the 25th percentile SNF to the 75th percentile SNF.

Werner et al. note that this small economic response implies that SNFs are unlikely to invest in quality improvement since improving quality will not increase market share and improve profits.

One shortcoming of the study is that it only focuses on SNFs.  Since Medicare uses SNFs for shorter term post-acute care, the study cannot identify changing consumer responses for long-term nursing stays.  Because the time the patient spends in long-term nursing homes is typically much longer than SNFs and because patients typically have more time to review their long-term nursing home options than would be the case when they enter SNFs, it is more likely that a consumer response would be observed in the long-term nursing home setting.

Sources:

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Medicare Spending per Beneficiary

April 30, 2012 in Hospitals, Medicaid/Medicare, Medicare, My Papers, P4P, Quality | 1 comment

Medicare’s Hospital Compare website evaluates hospital quality.  One of the most recent measures to be added to Hospital Compare is a measure of efficiency.  The measure calculates a price-standardized, case-mix adjusted measure of spending during period before, during and after a hospital admission. The Healthcare Economist (Jason Shafrin) and a team at Acumen (including Tom MaCurdy, Sajid Zaidi, Elen Shrestha, and David Pham) worked closely with CMS to develop this measure.  Additional information on this measure is available here or see the results for San Francisco General Hospital here.

“The Spending per Hospital Patient with Medicare measure shows whether Medicare spends more, less, or about the same per Medicare patient treated in a specific hospital, compared to how much Medicare spends per patient nationally. This measure includes any Medicare Part A and Part B payments made for services provided to a patient during the 3 days prior to the hospital stay, during the stay, and during the 30 days after discharge from the hospital.

This result is a ratio calculated by dividing the amount Medicare spends per patient for an episode of care initiated at this hospital by the median (or middle) amount Medicare spent per patient nationally.

A result of 1 means that Medicare spends ABOUT THE SAME amount per patient for an episode of care initiated at this hospital as it does per hospital patient nationally.

A result that is more than 1 means that Medicare spends MORE per patient for an episode of care initiated at this hospital than it does per hospital patient nationally.

A result that is less than 1 means that Medicare spends LESS per patient for an episode of care initiated at this hospital than it does per hospital patient nationally.

Lower numbers are better.“

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All-or-Nothing P4P

April 4, 2012 in P4P, Pharmaceuticals, Quality | No comments

Many of Medicare’s value-based purchasing (VBP) initiatives offer a continuum of rewards based on provider performance.  Whereas all-or-nothing VBP initiatives only grant bonuses to providers who exceed a single threshold, the Medicare VBP programs–such as its hospital VBP program–reward hospitals based a value-based modifier that is proportional to its quality score.

One of the reasons to avoid the ‘all-or-nothing’ framework is that providers who are far from the threshold may give up; they may not invest significant efforts to improve quality since the change of reaching the threshold may be small.

A paper by Dowd, Feldmand and Nersesian (2012) finds that providers do in fact ‘give up’ in practice if the threshold is set too high.  The paper examines a physician network’s efforts to improve their generic prescription rate (GPR).  The authors find that:

“The GPR-maximizing target would induce an improvement in average GPR from 58.3% to 65.8% or 7.5 percentage points.  When the target is set above 80%, practices with equilibrium GPR below 58.3% will ‘give up’ in the sense that they will not improve relative to their equilibrium value.”

Source:

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Why are there no doctor reviews on the web?

March 19, 2012 in Quality | No comments

The N.Y. Times has an interesting article citing a number of reasons why there are no good websites with doctors reviews on the web.  There are some ratings websites (HealthGrades, RateMDs, Angie’s List, Yelp), but the listings are often sparse, with few contributors and little of substance.)

For one, physicians don’t like them.

“Several years ago, a physician reputation management service called Medical Justice developed a sort of liability vaccine. Doctors would ask patients to sign an agreement promising not to post about the doctor online; in exchange, patients would get additional privacy protections.

…when I shared my feelings with the company, I was informed that the agreements had outlived their usefulness. What neither its vice president of marketing, Shane Stadler, nor its founder and chief executive, Jeffrey Segal, told me, however, was that the company had retired the agreements in the wake of a lawsuit related to them and a complaint filed with the Federal Trade Commission.”

The American Medical Association (AMA), unsurprisingly, stands behind the doctors.  A statement from AMA president, Dr. Peter W. Carmel stated,

“Anonymous online opinions of physicians should be taken with grain of salt and should not be a patient’s sole source of information when looking for a new physician.”

Dr. Carmel followed up by saying:

“To advise people anonymously through an open site when this is an important decision for people’s lives, I don’t think it’s proper.  The evidence that’s given on many of these consumer sites is undocumented, unverified and anonymous. It may well have nothing to do with actual patient treatment.”

Another reason there are so few reviews are that people do not want to offend their doctor.  They are worried that if their physician reads a poor review from a patient, they may provide inferior care to the patient.  Further, “if they live in a small town or are only one or two degrees of social separation from physicians or their family members, they may not want to create any awkwardness.”

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Where is the Quality Incentive Program for End-Stage Renal Disease Facilities heading in 2013 and 2014?

March 14, 2012 in Medicare, P4P | No comments

Medicare payments for End Stage Renal Disease rely on a value-based purchasing (VBP) system known as the Quality Incentive Program (QIP). Today I review proposed changes to the QIP that will effect the payments for dialysis centers in 2013 and 2014.

Payment Year 2013

Two measures have been adopted for the payment year (PY) 2013 ESRD QIP

  • Percentage of patients with hemoglobin levels greater than 12 g/dL (Hemoglobin Greater Than 12 g/dL) Lower percentage indicates better care
  • Percentage of patients with a Urea Reduction Ratio (URR) of 65% or greater (Hemodialysis Adequacy) Higher percentage indicates better care

To qualify for a score, facilities must have at least 11 patients eligible for each measure.

Each facility that meets or exceeds performance standard for a measure receives 10 points (for each measure).  For other facilities, the scoring is more complex.

  • Facility does not meet the performance standard for a measure: 2 points subtracted from 10 points for every 1% below the performance standard
  • Total Performance Score = Sum of the Two Measure Scores x 1.5

The payment reduction for payment year 2013 depend on the total performance score (TPS) as follows:

  • 30 points: 0%
  • 26-29 points: 1.0%
  • 21-25 points: 1.5%
  • <21 points: 2.0%

 

Payment Year 2014

In PY 2014, the ESRD QIP will add one clinical measure (vascular access type (VAT)) and three reporting measures.  The reporting measures include:

  • Dialysis event data submission to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) system
  • Patient Satisfaction (measured by In-center Hemodialysis Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems (ICH CAHPS) survey)
  • Monthly mineral metabolism monitoring (serum calcium and serum phosphorus)

For PY 2014, there is a significant lag between when the data are collected and when payments are adjusted.  PY 2014 is based off a performance period of CY2012 and a baseline period of July 1, 2010 to June 30, 2011.  The baseline data is used to measure an improvement score.

 

The payment reduction for payment year 2014 depend on the total performance score (TPS) as follows:

  • 53-100 points: 0%
  • 43-52 points: 0.5%
  • 33-42 points: 1.0%
  • 23-32 points: 1.5%
  • <23 points: 2.0%

The scoring system and performance standards are outlined in more detail here.

 

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Medicare Reforms Linking Reimbursement Rates with Hospital Performance

February 23, 2012 in Health Reform, Hospitals, Medicare, P4P | No comments

Health reform not only changes the health care market for the demand side (e.g., patients, insurers), but also for the supply side (e.g., hospitals, physicians).  In the Medicare setting, a number of initiatives have aimed to pay providers who provide high-quality or low-cost care more money, and pay providers who provide low-quality or high-cost care less money.  CSC provides a nice overview of some of these initiatives.

  • Performance Value-Based Purchasing (VBP) — Offers increased update to diagnosis-related group (DRG) payment rates to hospitals according to demonstration of performance or improvement in designated performance areas relative to performance standards and benchmarks.
  • Shared Savings Program — For groups of providers who form an Accountable Care Organization (ACO), potentially shares a portion of financial savings in caring for Medicare patients if performance standards are met, according to performance rated on a sliding scale against benchmarks.
  • Readmission Reduction Program (RRP) — Decreases annual adjustments to DRG payment rates for hospitals that are in the lowest performance quartile for excess readmissions of Medicare patients with selected discharge diagnoses.
  • HAC Payment Limitation — Decreases annual adjustments to DRG payment rates for hospitals that are in the lowest performance quartile for a designated set of Hospital-Acquired Conditions (HACs).
  • Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative — One of several initiatives of the CMS Innovation Center to give doctors and hospitals new incentives to coordinate care, improve the quality of care and save money for Medicare. Bundle care for a package of services patients receive to treat a specific medical condition during a single hospital stay and/or recovery from that stay. Applicants pick conditions to target and one of four ways to define the extent of pre- and post-hospital care included in the bundled payment.

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Do Disease Management and Value-Based Purchasing Programs Work?

February 15, 2012 in Medicare, P4P | 2 comments

In short, the answer is no. The CBO released an issue brief examining two types of demonstrations.

  • Disease management and care coordination demonstrations have sought to improve the quality of care of beneficiaries with chronic illnesses and those whose health care is expected to be particularly costly.
  • Value-based payment demonstrations have given health care providers financial incentives to improve the quality and efficiency of care rather than payments based strictly on the volume and intensity of services delivered.

“The evaluations show that most programs have not reduced Medicare spending: In nearly every program involving disease management and care coordination, spending was either unchanged or increased relative to the spending that would have occurred in the absence of the program, when the fees paid to the participating organizations were considered. Programs in which care managers had substantial direct interaction with physicians and significant in-person interaction with patients were more likely to reduce Medicare spending than other programs, but on average even those programs did not achieve enough savings to offset their fees.”

Today, the healthcare economist looks at these programs in more detail.

Disease Management Demonstrations

These demonstrations were made up of 34 programs operated by disease management companies. “The programs used nurses as care managers to educate patients about their chronic illnesses, encourage them to follow self-care regimens, monitor their health, and track whether they received recommended tests and treatments. In most programs, the care managers were not integrated into physicians’ practices, and their contact with patients was primarily by telephone.”

These programs targeted Medicare beneficiaries with specific chronic diseases. Most programs were not tailored to focus on chronically ill beneficiaries who were expected to have the highest cost of care. The results are displayed in the chart:

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CBO found that the lack of integration into the physician practice and the lack of physical presence made most of these disease management programs not useful.

Value-Based Purchasing Demonstrations

The list below describes the four major VBP demonstration programs and their findings.

  • Physician Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration. 10 large practices were permitted to keep some of the estimated savings if they reduced total Medicare spending for their patients. In the second year of the demonstration, average Medicare spending excluding the bonuses paid to physician groups was about 1 percent below projections; with bonuses included, average
    Medicare spending was just 0.1 percent below projections—about $7 per beneficiary. Results for years 3 and 4 of the PGP demonstration are currently being analyzed.
  • Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration. 278 hospitals were offered bonuses if their scores on quality-of-care measures were in the top tier of participating hospitals.  This demonstration had no net effect on Medicare spending.
  • Home Health Pay-for-Performance Demonstration. This demonstration allowed 273 home health agencies to keep some of the estimated savings if they reduced total Medicare spending for their patients and met certain criteria regarding quality of care.  Initial results indicate that this demonstration had no net effect on Medicare spending.
  • Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center Demonstration. Medicare made bundled payments to cover all inpatient hospital and physicians’ services for coronary artery bypass graft surgeries conducted at seven participating hospitals. Bundled payments reduced Medicare’s expenditures for heart bypass surgeries by about 10 percent, and there were no apparent
    adverse effects on patients’ outcomes.

Whereas the first three VBP programs aimed to give providers bonuses for reducing cost and increasing quality, the Heart Bypass Center demonstration relied on bundled payments to align the financial incentives offered to hospitals and physicians. The bundled payments reduced cost without decreasing quality. Of course, measuring quality is difficult and it is possible that the Bypass demonstration did not fully capture all important aspects of quality. Nevertheless, these initial results indicate that bundling may be a more promising cost-saving mechanism than provider bonuses.

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How Health Reform will affect Hospital’s Business Strategy

January 19, 2012 in Health Reform, Hospitals, P4P | No comments

For many years, fee for service payment was the status quo. FFS model encourages hospitals to adopt the following strategies to maximize market share and profits:

  • Centered on short-term acute care
  • Focused on specialist alignment
  • Driven by a volume-based service-line strategy
  • Using expensive medical equipment purchases to encourage physician referrals
  • Attracting patients with new construction in support of market share growth
  • Short-term acute hospitals focus on profitable service lines such as oncology, cardiology, neurology, and orthopedics.

Specific examples of this growth are abundant.  In Indianapolis, all four of their hospital systems built coronary surgery centers at a combined cost of $210 million.  A community hospital 15 miles north of the city opened a smaller, open-heart surgery program.  In Cincinnati, nine hospitals performed open heart surgery. Eight Boston Hospitals Have da Vinci System, which may indicate that robotic surgery may be used for marketing purposes.

However,  health reform has started to change these trends.  Medicare is instituting more bundled payment (e.g., dialysis payments)  rather than pure fee-for-service.  Further, Medicare’s Shared Savings Program (MSSP)  aims to use Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) to coordinate patient care improve quality and reduce the rate of growth in health care spending.

How will hospitals respond to the changing market landscape?  One way hospitals can improve their margins is to only treat healthier patients to improve their performance in the case where risk adjustment methods are imprecise.  Also, provider mergers may be a trend. Access larger populations will lessen risk providers must bear under new payment models.  Larger size also means that hospitals can negotiate better rates with suppliers.  Hospitals will likely sell redundant or non-core assets.

Hospitals will also adopt new technology to better manage care. For instance, Henry Ford Health System in Detroit uses an embedded specialized software called RadPort in its electronic physician order entry system that prompts physicians to enter specific information when ordering radiology tests.  The pilot, funded with a CMS grant, will see whether these prompts will reduce utilization levels.

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Patient Centered Medical Home: Is your doctor ready?

January 17, 2012 in Medical Home, Quality, Supply of Medical Services | 1 comment

The answer is probably not.  The NCQA defines 149 factors which would make a practice a successful medical home.  These include physician access during and after office hours, electronic access to patients information, availability of clinical data and use of that data for population management, identification of high risk patients, ability to refer patients to available community resources, care coordinate, and quality measure tracking.

As recent Health Economics articles finds that almost half of physician practices fail to meet the NCQA’s medical home standards.  Specifically,

“Forty-six percent…of all practices lack sufficient medical home infrastructure. While 72.3 percent…of multi-specialty groups would achieve recognition, only 49.8 percent…of solo/partnership practices meet NCQA standards. Although better prepared than specialists, 40 percent of primary care practices would not qualify as a medical home under present criteria.”

Read the rest of this entry »

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