ACOs

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Medicare recently release a request for proposal for health care agencies to participate in both the Medicare Shared Savings Program and the Pioneer Accountable Care Organization (ACO) pilot project.  The Pioneer ACO project is similar to the Shared Savings Program but has higher levels of cost sharing and (in year 3 of the pilot) partially uses population-based reimbursement.  The goal of both these project is basically to move towards more integrated care.  Although ACOs seem new, they are basically just efforts to move towards something akin to a staff-model HMOs.

There are some differences however.  Both Medicare ACO programs require the ACO to notify the beneficiary that they are participating the ACO.  Further, the ACO will be responsible for reducing cost for these beneficiaries.  Unlike in a traditional HMO, however, on the patients end the ACO is non-binding.  Whereas many private managed care plans force patients to choose a primary care provider (PCP), Medicare patients can still see any physician they want without a referral.  According to CMS:

Medical ACO models on offer do not involved beneficiary enrollment or lock in.  They do not involve gatekeeping or pre-authorization.  It is traditional Medicare.

Instead,  Medicare assigns the beneficiary to physicians in the ACOs based on the patient’s base treatment history.  [Note: In the Pioneer ACO, Medicare assigns beneficiaries to a physician in an ACO who has the largest amount of primary care evaluation and management (E&M) claim cost].

Another similarity between ACOs and managed care is that Medicare ACOs are moving towards capitation payments.  In the third year of the Pioneer ACO pilot, Medicare will give the ACO a population-based payment worth 50 percent of the estimated cost of care for that beneficiary.   Providers will only receive 50 percent of their typical payments in the for of fee-for-service reimbursement, and the ACO will determine what share of the population based payment each provider should receive.

ACOs also increase the size of the provider organizations.  The Shared Shavings Program mandates a minimum number of beneficiaries of 5,000; the Pioneer ACO minimum is 15,000 (except for rural areas).   This trend towards larger provider organizations  could increase provider leverage in negotiations with Medicare regarding future reimbursement rates.

Why does Medicare like ACOs?  It gives providers a significant incentive to reduce cost.  In the Shared Savings Plan:

…an ACO that meets the program’s quality performance standards would be eligible to receive a share of the savings it generates below a specific expenditure benchmark that would be set by CMS for each ACO.  The proposed rule would also hold ACOs accountable for downside risk by requiring ACOs to repay Medicare for a portion of losses (expenditures above its benchmark).

Putting providers at risk for cost increases will incentivize savings, but physicians are not known as the best risk managers.  It a managed care, population based capitation payment is where Medicare is heading, incentivizing more people to join Medicare Advantage may be a more sensible option.

For more information on ACOs, see some of my previous posts.

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Do you support Accountable Care Organizations?  Many policymakers think they are a great idea.  Why?  If ACOs better integrate care coordination between a variety of physician specialists and other providers, ACOs can increase the efficiency of the health care system.  Improving quality and reducing cost sounds like a great idea.

To implement these integrated care settings in practice, however, Michael Cannon notes that potential ACOs would be funded through savings they provide to Medicare.  This also sound pretty attractive.

If you are a provider, however, ACOs may be couched in a different light: lower reimbursement levels.  If the government believes ACOs can improve efficiency, Medicare can pay providers less for the same services (and ostensibly maintain the same quality level).

Robert Laszewski writes, “Here’s a flash for the policy wonks pushing ACOs: They only work if the provider gets paid less for the same patient population. Why would they be dumb enough to voluntarily accept that outcome?”

In the short-run, the answer is no.  As I’ve mentioned in the past, however, in the long-run, ACOs can increase provider market share and give Medicare less bargaining power in the long-run.

Medicare’s short-run push to coordinate care and reduce cost may result in a more concentrated fee-for-service marketplace and higher Medicare cost in the long-run.  Medicare may want to stick with it’s existing form of ACOs: Medicare Advantage plans.

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The good thing about the systems not being highly integrated and coordinated is that premiums are lower. Why are those hospitals and physicians [integrating]?  It wasn’t for increased coordination of care, disease management, blah, blah, blah—that was not the primary reason. They wanted more money and market share.

  • A Fresno, California medical group physician

Using examples from the California market, Berenson, Ginsburg and Kemper (2010) detail how accountable care organizations (ACOs) may be used by providers to drive up prices.  California is an interesting market to study for ACOs as they have a number of their prototypes: multispecialty group practices and large independent practices associations (IPAs).

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