Hospitals

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Why is end-of-life spending so high?

April 25, 2012 in Hospitals, International Health Care Systems | 3 comments

The answer is because using more intensive services does reduce mortality.

This is the finding of a recent JAMA paper. After controlling for patient case mix, the authors examine variation in hospital spending in the last year of a patient’s life. The authors note that “Higher-spending hospitals differed in many ways, such as greater use of evidence-based care, skilled nursing and critical care staff, more intensive inpatient specialist services, and high technology, all of which are more expensive.” Higher spending hospitals (on a per patient basis) tend to be hospitals with a larger volume of patients. They are also more likely to “be located in urban areas; be associated with regional cancer centers; have on-site computed tomography and magnetic resonance imaging scanners, cardiac catheterization laboratories, and cardiac surgery capability; and be early adopters of critical care response teams.”

Higher spending hospitals had overall reduced mortality rates for four disease considered. “In the highest- vs lowest-spending hospitals, respectively, the age- and sex-adjusted 30-day mortality rate was 12.7% vs 12.8% for AMI, 10.2% vs 12.4% for CHF, 7.7% vs 9.7% for hip fracture, and 3.3% vs 3.9% for colon cancer.”

One reason for these differences could be that high-spending areas could be located in richer areas where mortality rates are lower for a variety of reasons. Although unobserved heterogeneity in patient case mix is a problem with any study, the authors do stratify their results based on neighborhood income and find similar results.

The relevance of this study to the United States, however, is hard to determine. Although high spending hospitals decrease mortality in Canada, almost all hospitals in the U.S. would be considered high spending by Canadian standards. Thus, it is unclear that marginal returns to additional spending in the U.S. would be similar to what was observed in this study. In fact, studies in the United States by Barnato et al. and Goodman et al. show “…a positive association between spending and outcomes among low-intensity hospitals or regions but no association at average or higher intensity levels.”
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Do safety net hospitals provide care strategically?

April 23, 2012 in Health Insurance, Hospitals, Medicaid | No comments

It is widely known that safety net hospitals provide less intensive care than hospitals whose patient base is mostly commercially-insured.  One question is whether safety net hospitals discriminate the care provided based on their patients insurance status.  In other words, do commerically insured individuals who visit safety net hospitals receive more care than patients treated at these same hospitals with no insurnce or who are covered by Medicaid?

Based on data from Virginia looking at surgery wait times and rates of breast re-construction surgery, the answer appears to be ‘no.’  A 2012 study by Bradley and co-authors finds the following:

“There is little evidence to suggest that safety net hospitals attenuate treatment differences between insurance and racial groups. The time between diagnosis and surgery was longer in safety net hospitals for all patients, regardless of insurance source or race. Perhaps safety net hospitals are operating at capacity and are unable to schedule surgeries in a timely manner. If this is the case, their resources may be further stretched following the passage of the PPACA. Alternatively, as these hospitals are teaching hospitals, they may perform additional diagnostic tests prior to scheduling surgery or physicians who treat low-income patients may have a slower referral process.”

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Medicare Payments for Hospitals in Under-served Areas

January 23, 2012 in Hospitals, Medicare | No comments

One of the goals of Medicare is to provide its beneficiaries access to quality care regardless of where they live.  Thus, the Medicare program provides financial incentives to providers located in these remote areas.

Whereas most Medicare pays most hospitals through the inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS), it pays certain rural hospitals based on their reported costs.  Medicare pays Critical Access Hospitals (CAH), for instance, 101 percent of its report cost for inpatient, outpatient, laboratory, and therapy services.  It also pays this providers 101 percent of their cost for post-acute care for CAH beds are “swing beds” (which are beds that can be used for either acute or post-acute care).

However, how should Medicare define ‘critical’? The simplest definition is just whether a hospital is in a rural (i.e., non-metropolitan) area. However, there are various gradations of ‘rural’. A rural hospital on the outskirts of a big city would be far less ‘critical’ then one very far from distant areas. One could define ‘critical’ based on facility volume. If the low volume is due to poor quality, however, defining these hospitals as critical could just reward poor hospitals. Third, could define a hospital as isolated based on its distance from other facilities who could provide comparable care. Alternatively, one could identify critical hospitals based on demographic factors such as population density in the surrounding areas.

Below, I provide more information on other types of types of rural hospital designations in Medicare.
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How Health Reform will affect Hospital’s Business Strategy

January 19, 2012 in Health Reform, Hospitals, P4P | No comments

For many years, fee for service payment was the status quo. FFS model encourages hospitals to adopt the following strategies to maximize market share and profits:

  • Centered on short-term acute care
  • Focused on specialist alignment
  • Driven by a volume-based service-line strategy
  • Using expensive medical equipment purchases to encourage physician referrals
  • Attracting patients with new construction in support of market share growth
  • Short-term acute hospitals focus on profitable service lines such as oncology, cardiology, neurology, and orthopedics.

Specific examples of this growth are abundant.  In Indianapolis, all four of their hospital systems built coronary surgery centers at a combined cost of $210 million.  A community hospital 15 miles north of the city opened a smaller, open-heart surgery program.  In Cincinnati, nine hospitals performed open heart surgery. Eight Boston Hospitals Have da Vinci System, which may indicate that robotic surgery may be used for marketing purposes.

However,  health reform has started to change these trends.  Medicare is instituting more bundled payment (e.g., dialysis payments)  rather than pure fee-for-service.  Further, Medicare’s Shared Savings Program (MSSP)  aims to use Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) to coordinate patient care improve quality and reduce the rate of growth in health care spending.

How will hospitals respond to the changing market landscape?  One way hospitals can improve their margins is to only treat healthier patients to improve their performance in the case where risk adjustment methods are imprecise.  Also, provider mergers may be a trend. Access larger populations will lessen risk providers must bear under new payment models.  Larger size also means that hospitals can negotiate better rates with suppliers.  Hospitals will likely sell redundant or non-core assets.

Hospitals will also adopt new technology to better manage care. For instance, Henry Ford Health System in Detroit uses an embedded specialized software called RadPort in its electronic physician order entry system that prompts physicians to enter specific information when ordering radiology tests.  The pilot, funded with a CMS grant, will see whether these prompts will reduce utilization levels.

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Medicare’s Agenda for Hospital Accountability

November 14, 2011 in Hospitals, Medicare, P4P | 1 comment

CSC provies a nice overview of some of Medicare’s hospital quality initiatives. These initiatives include a value-based purchasing (VBP) program, reduced reimbursement for excessive hospital readmissions, and reduced reimbursement for hospital-acquired conditions (HAC).  Each of these three broad quality initiatives is described in more detail after the jump.

It is important to note that these quality initiatives are not voluntary and affect hospital payments through adjustments to the base DRG rate. Broadly, measures fall into three categories: i) claims-based, chart-abstracted, and patient satisfaction (i.e., HCAHPS).  Many of these quality measures will be part of the Inpatient Quality Reporting (IQR) program and will included in the Hospital Compare website.

Also, Medicare is implementing these three programs on top of similar programs which include:

  • Non-payment for care to treat specific HACs (see here)
  • A Medicaid program which also will not pay for care to treat HACs (see here)
  • Mandated review by QIOs of hospital readmissions within 31 days to assess standards of care and potentially recommend denial of payment (see here)

 

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Medicare to Hospitals: The Patient is Always Right

November 10, 2011 in Health Reform, Hospitals, Medicaid/Medicare, Medicare, P4P, Quality | 4 comments

Starting in fiscal year 2014, Medicare will start rewarding hospitals with high quality care and penalizing hospitals with low quality care.  The rewards and penalties will be financial in nature. High-quality hospitals will receive a bonus and low-quality hospitals will receive a financial penalty.  There is a lot of existing documentation on this hospital value-based purchasing (HVBP) program such as:

One component of the HVBP is patient satisfaction.  Some policy experts believe that patient satisfaction is of the utmost importance.  If Medicare evaluates hospitals based on patient satisfaction, then hospitals will compete to improve how well patients are satisfied. A New York Times article already mentions some of the efforts hospitals are undertaking to improve patient satisfaction.  For example,

  • Improving the quality of food
  • Renovating units
  • Creating more single units (compared to shared units)
  • Having nurses visit rooms hourly
  • Creating scripts for doctor-patient and nurse-patient interactions
  • Quicker response time ["Jefferson Regional Medical Center in Pittsburgh expects all employees, from maintenance workers to doctors, to respond to a patient’s call light or find someone to offer assistance."]
  • Building more elevators.

Elevators!?!?!  It turns out that “NYU found that long waits at its elevators drove down its scores, so now it is building a new bank of elevators.”

Hospitals complain, however, that they may only have a limited ability to influence ratings.  This is certainly true in some cases. For instance, patient expectations of the standard of care they receive may vary regionally.  For example,

“…some of the nation’s most prestigious hospitals, including Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles and the University of Chicago Medical Center, get lower marks from patients on most areas of patient experiences, according to the government’s Hospital Compare Web site.

So do many of New York City’s elite institutions…Some hospitals, like NYU, get bad patient reviews even as they score average or superior in measures of clinical care from the government and accreditation groups.

‘People in New York have very high expectations about what it means to be taken care of,’ said Dr. Katherine Hochman, an NYU physician. ‘When they don’t get their food on time and have to spend eight hours in the emergency department, well, that’s just not their image of what a world-class institution is.’”

Further, many providers believe that indigent patients give physicians lower quality scores even though these patients receive the same care as do richer patients.  Hospitals with more Medicaid-eligible patients could receive lower patient satisfaction scores due to case mix alone rather than due to actual quality.

To account for these confounding factors, Medicare can institute a risk adjustment mechanism.  By including patient income (or Medicaid) status in their model, however, Medicare would implicitly be allowing hospitals to provide a lower standard of care to the poor. Alternatively, if the poor do in fact give lower satisfaction scores, than hospitals may have an incentive to avoid these patients.

Similarly, including regional indicators in the risk adjustment model can also be problematic.  If New Yorkers have higher standards than individuals from Iowa, then one may want to normalize performance regional.  If CMS adopts this specifications, hospitals in essence would only be compared against their local peers.  Areas which have consistently below average care–in terms of patient satisfaction–may not be punished if they are the ‘best of the worst’ in their area.

Although patient satisfaction is not always correlated with high quality medical care, paying hospitals more for care that meets their patients’ needs does seem to be a sensible solution.

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New Legislation affecting Medicare Hospital Payments

July 7, 2011 in Hospitals, Medicare | No comments

Recent Legislation

  • CMS completed its implementation of Medicare severity–diagnosis related groups (MS–DRGs) and cost-based relative weights in FY 2009.
  • TMA, Abstinence Education, and QI Programs Extension Act of 2007 (TMA), the Congress mandated payment reductions of 0.6 percent in 2008 and an additional 0.9 percent in 2009 to offset the effects of documentation and coding improvements (DCI) projected by the CMS Office of the Actuary (actual hospitals’ DCI increased payments by 2.5 percent in 2008 and by a cumulative 5.4 percent by 2009)

PPACA (i.e., Health Reform) changes to Medicare’s inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS) for hospitals

Below are six key changes that the PPACA legislation made to hospital payments in the current and future fiscal years.

  • PPACA1: Congress mandated a 0.25 percentage point reduction in the payment update for the second half of FY 2010 and for all of FY 2011.
  • PPACA2: Congress temporarily expanded (through 2012) the policy providing additional payments to hospitals that have a low volume of Medicare (not all payers) inpatient discharges and are 15 miles or more from the nearest PPS hospital.
  • PPACA3: Instituted a new two-year program to provide additional payments to hospitals located in counties with relatively low levels of Medicare spending (age, sex, and gender adjusted, but not health status adjusted)
  • PPACA4: PPACA extended for all of FY 2010 the provision in Section 508 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, which gave eligible hospitals an opportunity for a one-time reclassification to a different labor market and allowed this change to increase their payments.
  • PPACA5: The frontier wage index floor will guarentee that hospitals in Montana, North Dakota, Nevada, South Dakota, and Wyoming will maintain a wage index equal to no less than 1.0.
  • PPACA6: Beginning in FY 2011 a rural-floor budget-neutrality adjustment will be applied on a national level, rather than on a state level. CMS estimated that this policy change will increase payments for urban hospitals whose wage index is raised up to the state’s rural level and will decrease payments for other hospitals (including all rural hospitals), which pay for the floor through a budgetneutrality adjustment.

Outpatient

  • Rural hospitals with 100 or fewer beds receive hold-harmless outpatient payments through 2011.  Thus, the switch from a cost-based to OPPS payment system will not effect reimbursement negatively for these providers.  In January 2012, the OPPS system is set to be instituted for these providers.

Source: MedPAC’s March 2011 Report to Congress.

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Negotiating Power

June 14, 2011 in Health Insurance, Hospitals, Physician Compensation, Supply of Medical Services | No comments

On Monday I attended a talk at AcademyHealth on the impact of market consolidation on the cost of health care.  Particularly interesting was Robert (Bob) Berenson’s analysis of the effect of provider consolidation on negotiating power and health care prices.  Particularly, provider have been gaining market power of late, according to recent CTS site visits.  There are three main reasons for this:

  1. A failure of employers to agree to “narrow networks” of providers and thus be able to drive down prices
  2. The end of the oversupply of hospital beds
  3. Provider clout due to name recognition (only for the “have” hospitals, not the have nots.

Further industry consolidation has taken three main forms over the last few years:

  1. Multi-hospital chains are buying more hospitals,
  2. Hospitals are employing more physicians directly, and
  3. Physicians are consolidating into groups.

Physician consolidation is particularly interesting.  Physicians consolidate not only to gain negotiating leverage, but a larger practice allows for physicians to start performing ancillary services such as labs and imaging.

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Price Competition for UK Hospitals?

January 13, 2011 in Hospitals, International Health Care Systems, Regulation, Supply of Medical Services | 6 comments

Is health reform coming to the UK?  Since the middle of the decade, the NHS has used a tariff system which pays a fixed price per procedure. Now, however, the Financial Times, reports that the UK plans for “public and private hospitals to compete on price for the treatment of NHS patients.”  The reform calls for quality monitoring to ensure that quality does not slip.

What do British health economists think of the reforms?

  • Zack Cooper, a health economist at the London School of Economics, said introducing price competition “would be a hugely retro­grade step”. In ordinary markets, he said, people can see the trade-off between price and quality. “But in healthcare, it is difficult to measure quality, partly because the process is complex and partly because it may take days, weeks or even years for the outcome of treatment to become evident.” [In the U.S.], the use of fixed prices in the federally funded Medicare programme for the elderly has helped raise quality. “I’m very pro-competition in healthcare,” he said. “But price competition is not the right way to do it.”
  • Anita Charlesworth, chief economist at the Nuffield Trust health think-tank, said the evidence from the 1990s, when family doctors could negotiate on price, was that a huge amount of time and money went in to pricing rather than the appropriateness or quality of care
  • Nick Bosanquet, professor of health economics at Imperial College, London, argues in favour of price competition. “If you want a more flexible system it is illogical to have fixed prices, and after years of fixed prices in the NHS there is still a big variation in the quality of care.”

In my opinion, the value of price competition depends on your perception of how well patients and government can judge quality.  In a world without asymmetric information, it is clear that price competition is optimal.  The government could buy medical services by optimizing along a continuum of quality and price.  Even in the presence of asymmetric information, price competition can be a good thing especially if there are some observable–although imperfect–signals of quality.

If quality is completely unobservable, then providers would have an incentive to minimize quality and drive down price.   Unless of course, patients take price as a signal for quality.  In this case, higher priced providers could gain market share because of a false perception of quality.

In the case where the consumer would pay for medical services, one justification for fixed pricing would occur if the government is better able to measure quality than individuals.  For instance, individuals may be better at judging quality in terms of office amenities and the physician’s bedside manner, but policymakers can better judge whether providers follow best practices and have superior outcomes on average.  If society can agree that outcomes matter more than office amenities, than the government could regulate quality and counteract provider’s incentivize to drive down their costs to maximize profits.

It is not a foregone conclusion that the experts inside or outside the government can measure quality better than can patients. For instance, in the same FT article, Ms. Charlesworth, states that it “was  ’particularly worrying’ that GPs will set local prices for mental health services where quality is even harder to measure than in acute care.”  If quality is so difficult to measure, how can policymakers measure that quality has decreased after the implementation of price competition?

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Medicare Hospital Value-Based Purchasing

December 7, 2010 in Hospitals, P4P, Quality | 4 comments

The Health Reform (ACA) legislation mandated Medicare establish a hospital value-based purchasing (VBP) program by 2012.  In fact, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 already authorized Medicare to develop a plan to implement VBP for 2009.   How will they do this?  A CMS report from 2007 sheds some light on the topic.

Since 2005, Medicare began the Reporting Hospital Quality Data for Annual Payment Update (with the incredibly unintelligible acronym of RHQDAPU).  RHQDAPU at first just required hospitals to report quality measures.  The Health Reform VBP initiatives, however, will begin to pay hospitals based on their performance on these metrics.  The 2007 CMS report claims that any VBP plan should contain the following 7 components.

  1. A Performance Assessment Model that is used to score a hospital’s performance on a specified set of measures, generating a Total Performance Score for each hospital.
  2. Translation of the VBP Total Performance Score into an incentive payment.
  3. A measure development process, including selection criteria for choosing performance measures for the financial incentive, and candidate measures for VBP Program start.
  4. A phased approach to transition from RHQDAPU to VBP.
  5. Redesigned data submission and validation infrastructure to support the VBP Program requirements.
  6. Enhancements to the Hospital Compare website to support expanded public reporting of performance results.
  7. An approach to monitoring VBP impacts, including potential impacts on health disparities.

Below I discuss aspects of hospital VBP in more detail.

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