Being a doctor is difficult. You need to graduate from medical school and learn a ton of difficult scientific concepts. You need to stay up to date on the latest medical developments. You need to cater to sick, needy patients (and their family). Any you need to get paid.
Earning a living is not as simple for doctors as other professions. Sure doctors make a lot of money. But knowing how much they get paid for a particular service is complex.
I provide an overview of the physician reimbursement system here. That overview does not take into account all the payment modifiers in the Medicare’s physician reimbursement system. Consider the following payment modifiers:
- For many procedures, Medicare pays providers for the professional and technical component. The professional component is the physician’s work and expertise; the technical component provides reimbursement for equipment and supplemental staff needed to perform the procedure. If the procedure is billed globally, then the physician receives both components. If another entity performed the technical component, then the physician is only paid for the professional component. For instance, for lab tests, the lab may run the test (technical component) but the physician would be the one interpreting the test (professional component).
- If you assist in a surgery, you receive 16% of the fee the primary surgeon does.Under some circumstances, the individual skills of two surgeons are required to perform surgery on the same patient during the same operative session. If you are a co-surgeon (rather than an assistant at surgery), you receive 62.5% of the typical reimbursement for that surgery.
- If you perform a bilateral surgery–a surgery done on both sides of the body (e.g., right arm and left arm)–then you receive 150% of the payment you would have received from doing a unilateral surgery.
- When multiple procedures are performed through the same endoscope, payment will be made for the highest valued endoscopy (100% of the allowance) plus the difference between the next highest and the base endoscopy.
- If you perform multiple surgeries in the same day on the same patient, you do not get paid the same amount as if these were performed on multiple days. The highest valued procedure is paid 100% of the allowance. For the second through the fifth highest valued procedures, the physician receives 50% of the typical payment amount.
- If you are a physician assistant, nurse practitioner, or a registered dietitian or nutritionists; you receive 85% of the payment an MD would receive for performing the same service.
- If you are a clinical social worker, you receive 75% of the payment an MD would receive for performing the same service.
- If you are a certified nurse midwife, you receive 85% of the payment an MD would receive for performing the same service. If you are a midwife, you only receive 65%.
- Participating providers receive the full Medicare Part B allowed amount as payment in full for services and bill the beneficiary only for any coinsurance or deductible that may apply. Payment for nonparticipating physicians (i.e., those who have not signed a Participating Payment Agreement) is 5 percent below the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule amount, but these physicians are permitted to bill patients up to 15 percent in excess of the fee schedule amount.
If you don’t think Medicare is bureaucratic, just take a look at those rules.
Bring Market Prices to Medicare
December 16, 2011 in Books, Health Insurance, Managed Care, Medicare, Medicare Advantage | 5 comments
Medicare is a government-run insurance program. Can policy changes be made to add competition to Medicare, maintain quality and reduce cost? A book titled Bring Market Prices to Medicare argues that it can through a competitive bidding process. This book makes a number of sensible arguments which I review today.
The main proposal of the book is a competitive bidding process for all Medicare plans. Currently, there is a form of competitive bidding only for Medicare Advantage (MA) managed care plans. The authors also argues for competitive bidding for fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare (i.e., Parts A and B). There is already a competitive bidding process for Medicare’s prescription drug program (Part D) which has worked well.
One of the main advantages of Medicare FFS is that beneficiaries do not need a referral for any services and are not limited to certain provider networks. However, Medicare beneficiaries do not pay for these added benefits. In addition, even if HMOs are more efficient than Medicare FFS, Medicare FFS beneficiaries still pay the same Part B premiums.
The authors want beneficiaries to face the true price differentials between the lowest cost plans and less efficient plans., regardless if the plan is Medicare FFS or an MA plan. Thus, beneficiaries would be responsible for any premium differences due to choosing a more expensive plan.
Currently, MA plans receive a variant of the average bid in their service area. The authors propose that Medicare would only pay for the lowest cost plan. This proposal would in essence be a transfer from plans and beneficiaries (who would have to pay the cost differential between the plan they choose and the lowest cost plan) to the government. Given the fiscal hole the federal government is facing, this is a good idea.
Authors also propose to eliminate the 25% tax on premiums. According to MedPAC, “Plans that bid below the benchmark also receive payment from Medicare in the form of a “rebate.” The law defines the rebate as 75 percent of the difference between the plan’s actual bid (not standardized) and its case mix-adjusted benchmark. The plan must then return the rebate to its enrollees in the form of supplemental benefits or lower premiums” The rebate structure gives plans a disincentive from lowering their bids since they only recover a share of the cost decreases.
Another issue focuses on regional adjustments. Living in New York is expensive and health care is more expensive in New York than in rural Mississippi. However, should Medicare subsidize New Yorkers because their health care is more expensive. The authors argue no, but poor individuals in high cost areas will be adversely affected by this policy choice.
A major issue is controlling quality. Plans could create low cost plans by providing low-quality care or failing to provide mandated services. Thus, CMS will need to regulate the plans. Plans with quality levels below a specific level would be barred from enrolling individuals or the government could force beneficiaries to pay additional premiums to enroll in these low quality plans. Public reporting of plan quality is also needed.
Strategic bidding is also a problem. Plans could collude to raise the bid price. However, by having Medicare FFS as an option will cap the amount colluding firms could increase prices. Further, a small firm could bid a very low amount and set the market. Medicare could set the benchmark at the lowest cost plan which meets a minimum size requirement.
Source:
Another Review of the Book:
Tags: AEI, Auction, Books, Competitive Bidding, HMO, Managed Care, Medicare