Medicare

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Being a doctor is difficult.  You need to graduate from medical school and learn a ton of difficult scientific concepts.  You need to stay up to date on the latest medical developments.  You need to cater to sick, needy patients (and their family).  Any you need to get paid.

Earning a living is not as simple for doctors as other professions.  Sure doctors make a lot of money.  But knowing how much they get paid for a particular service is complex.

I provide an overview of the physician reimbursement system here.  That overview does not take into account all the payment modifiers in the Medicare’s physician reimbursement system.  Consider the following payment modifiers:

  • For many procedures, Medicare pays providers for the professional and technical component.  The professional component is the physician’s work and expertise; the technical component provides reimbursement for equipment and supplemental staff needed to perform the procedure.  If the procedure is billed globally, then the physician receives both components.  If another entity performed the technical component, then the physician is only paid for the professional component.  For instance, for lab tests, the lab may run the test (technical component) but the physician would be the one interpreting the test (professional component).
  • If you assist in a surgery, you receive 16% of the fee the primary surgeon does.Under some circumstances, the individual skills of two surgeons are required to perform surgery on the same patient during the same operative session.  If you are a co-surgeon (rather than an assistant at surgery), you receive 62.5% of the typical reimbursement for that surgery.
  • If you perform a bilateral surgery–a surgery done on both sides of the body (e.g., right arm and left arm)–then you receive 150% of the payment you would have received from doing a unilateral surgery.
  • When multiple procedures are performed through the same endoscope, payment will be made for the highest valued endoscopy (100% of the allowance) plus the difference between the next highest and the base endoscopy.
  • If you perform multiple surgeries in the same day on the same patient, you do not get paid the same amount as if these were performed on multiple days.  The highest valued procedure is paid 100% of the allowance.  For the second through the fifth highest valued procedures, the physician receives 50% of the typical payment amount.
  • If you are a physician assistant, nurse practitioner, or a registered dietitian or nutritionists; you receive 85% of the payment an MD would receive for performing the same service.
  • If you are a clinical social worker, you receive 75% of the payment an MD would receive for performing the same service.
  • If you are a certified nurse midwife, you receive 85% of the payment an MD would receive for performing the same service.  If you are a midwife, you only receive 65%.
  • Participating providers receive the full Medicare Part B allowed amount as payment in full for services and bill the beneficiary only for any coinsurance or deductible that may apply. Payment for nonparticipating physicians (i.e., those who have not signed a Participating Payment Agreement) is 5 percent below the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule amount, but these physicians are permitted to bill patients up to 15 percent in excess of the fee schedule amount.

If you don’t think Medicare is bureaucratic, just take a look at those rules.

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The Healthcare Economist is going on vacation for the next week.

In the meantime, I pose to you, my reader, a bet.  Do you think the ‘doc fix’ gets passed?  Before you read on, make your predictions in the comments section below.

Healthcare Economist’s Prediction

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Medicare is a government-run insurance program.  Can policy changes be made to add competition to Medicare, maintain quality and reduce cost?  A book titled Bring Market Prices to Medicare argues that it can through a competitive bidding process. This book makes a number of sensible arguments which I review today.

The main proposal of the book is a competitive bidding process for all Medicare plans. Currently, there is a form of competitive bidding only for Medicare Advantage (MA) managed care plans. The authors also argues for competitive bidding for fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare (i.e., Parts A and B).  There is already a competitive bidding process for Medicare’s prescription drug program (Part D) which has worked well.

One of the main advantages of Medicare FFS is that beneficiaries do not need a referral for any services and are not limited to certain provider networks. However, Medicare beneficiaries do not pay for these added benefits. In addition, even if HMOs are more efficient than Medicare FFS, Medicare FFS beneficiaries still pay the same Part B premiums.

The authors want beneficiaries to face the true price differentials between the lowest cost plans and less efficient plans., regardless if the plan is Medicare FFS or an MA plan. Thus, beneficiaries would be responsible for any premium differences due to choosing a more expensive plan.

Currently, MA plans receive a variant of the average bid in their service area. The authors propose that Medicare would only pay for the lowest cost plan. This proposal would in essence be a transfer from plans and beneficiaries (who would have to pay the cost differential between the plan they choose and the lowest cost plan) to the government. Given the fiscal hole the federal government is facing, this is a good idea.

Authors also propose to eliminate the 25% tax on premiums. According to MedPAC, “Plans that bid below the benchmark also receive payment from Medicare in the form of a “rebate.” The law defines the rebate as 75 percent of the difference between the plan’s actual bid (not standardized) and its case mix-adjusted benchmark. The plan must then return the rebate to its enrollees in the form of supplemental benefits or lower premiums” The rebate structure gives plans a disincentive from lowering their bids since they only recover a share of the cost decreases.

Another issue focuses on regional adjustments. Living in New York is expensive and health care is more expensive in New York than in rural Mississippi. However, should Medicare subsidize New Yorkers because their health care is more expensive. The authors argue no, but poor individuals in high cost areas will be adversely affected by this policy choice.

A major issue is controlling quality. Plans could create low cost plans by providing low-quality care or failing to provide mandated services. Thus, CMS will need to regulate the plans. Plans with quality levels below a specific level would be barred from enrolling individuals or the government could force beneficiaries to pay additional premiums to enroll in these low quality plans. Public reporting of plan quality is also needed.

Strategic bidding is also a problem. Plans could collude to raise the bid price. However, by having Medicare FFS as an option will cap the amount colluding firms could increase prices. Further, a small firm could bid a very low amount and set the market. Medicare could set the benchmark at the lowest cost plan which meets a minimum size requirement.

Source:

Another Review of the Book:

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Nine million individuals qualify for both Medicare and Medicaid health insurance.  These individuals, known as dual-eligibles, rank among the most expensive Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries.  Duals are frequently hospitalized and often need long-term care.  In fact, most state spending for dual eligibles focuses on long-term care supports and services.

The federal government pays the bulk of care costs for dual eligibles. Of the $319.5 billion estimated as spent on duals in 2011, 80 percent ($256.6 billion) are federal dollars, more than two-thirds of which flowed through Medicare.

Unnecessary hospital use is one of the main drivers of inflated Medicare spending on duals.  One reason for this is that Medicare pays for all hospitalizations.  Thus, State Medicaid Agencies have less of an incentive to prevent costly hospitalizations.  Further, nursing homes also have an incentive to hospitalize duals.  Nursing home who care for an individual after they are hospitalized receive a higher Medicare skilled nursing facility (SNF) rates rather than the lower Medicaid long-term care rates.  Thus, nursing homes can increase their rates just by admitting their residents to teh hospital periodically.

Additionally: Dual eligibles experience far higher rates of “potentially preventable hospital admissions” than other Medicare beneficiaries: more than twice as high for pressure ulcers, asthma and diabetes; 52 percent higher for urinary tract infection; and over 30 percent higher for chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and bacterial pneumonia.

Many dual eligible individuals are enrolled in Medicare Special Needs Plans (SNP).  [Dual eligibles constitute about a million of the 1.3 million people enrolled in SNPs.]  Medicare pays these pays a capitated rate in exchange for providing a host of services to these beneficiaries.

The Affordable Care Act established of the Medicare-Medicaid Coordinated Care Office (known internally at CMS as the Office of the Duals), which has launched a number of initiatives to better align the programs.  A paper by Feder et al. makes the following recommendations:

  1. finance nurse practitioners in nursing homes to coordinate frail residents’ care (United Healthcare’s Evercare program has already demonstrated, relative to control groups, that this strategy can cut hospitalizations and emergency room use in half);
  2. apply performance standards, like those now applied to hospitals, to penalize SNFs with excessive rates of preventable hospitalizations for their residents (whether or not they are receiving SNF care).

Source:

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Currently, Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries receive significantly more choice than standard commercial plans.  They can choose any provider they wish (who accepts Medicare).  There are no cost-sharing differences between in-network and out-of-network doctors (because there is no ‘in-network’ for Medicare).  Although certain Part D prescription drug plans require prior authorization for specific drugs, few services (if any) currently require the beneficiary to receive prior authorization to be covered for a specific service.

Prior Authorization, however, may be on the way.  A demonstration for all Medicare beneficiaries who reside in seven states with high populations of fraud- and error-prone providers will have to secure prior authorization for certain medical equipment. The states participating in the demonstration include California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan, New York, North Carolina and Texas.

Some people will claim that prior authorization is rationing.  This is 100% true.  That doesn’t mean that it is a bad thing or anti-capitalist.  Commercial plans, particularly HMOs, often require prior authorization for certain services.  Further, the prior authorization can decrease fraud.  For example,

…some suppliers of medical equipment try to cheat Medicare by offering expensive powerwheelchairs and scooters to people who don’t qualify for these items. Also, some suppliers of medical equipment may call you without your permission, even though ‘cold calling’ isn’t allowed.

With Medicare costs climbing at a rapid, unsustainable pace, I see prior authorization in Medicare as one way to slow the growth of medical spending–particularly unnecessary medical spending. The question remains, although failing to implement prior authorization would create additional fiscal pressures, I am not sure if these types of measures are feasible politically.  Especially in a “Keep your government hands off my Medicare” environment.

 

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In short, yes. California is the land of managed care. Kaiser-Permanente–the managed care poster child–owns one third of the market.  Love for managed care is not just in the private market; in 2010, over half of all Medi-Cal and more than one-third of Medicare beneficiaries were enrolled in managed care plans.  Further, California managed care plans even have their own regulator.  Whereas the California Department of Insurance (CDI) regulates non HMOs, the California Department of Managed Health Care (DMHC) regulates HMOs.

A recent report by the California Health Care Foundation investigates managed care in California and provides a high quality overview of the California health insurance market.  Some of their findings include:

  • Five insurance carriers (Kaiser, Anthem Blue Cross, Health Net, Blue Shield, United Healthcare) accounted for three-fourths of the $105 billion health insurance revenues in California in 2010. Revenue growth has been slower for managed care plans in recent years, however.
  • The six largest managed care plans together lost more than 400,000 commercial enrollees. On the other hand, Medi-Cal and Medicare managed care enrollment grew.
  • Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield experienced enrollment decline in 2010, which reversed a previous growth trend.
  • Large majorities of HMO and PPO members rated their plan highly in terms of getting appointments quickly, finding a doctor, and getting the care they need. HMO enrollees more often rated their care highly than those enrolled in PPOs, while PPO participants were more likely to favorably cite their ability to get an appointment quickly.

Source: Katherine Wilson, “California Health Plans and Insurers” California Health Care Foundation, November 2011.

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The head of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), Don Berwick, announced he would step down from his post on Wednesday.  Berwick was a temporary 18 month appointment who Obama hoped would stay on longer.  The San Francisco Chronicle reports

The point man for carrying out President Obama’s health care law will be stepping down after Republicans succeeded in blocking his confirmation by the Senate, the White House announced Wednesday.

Don Berwick aimed to improve healthcare quality in Medicare.  Many individuals, however, have tried to improve the quality of care provided to Medicare enrollees.  Why would might Berwick’s efforts have been any more successful than his predecessors?  John McDonough of Health Stew notes that Berwick has a legacy of promoting quality improvement across a variety of healthcare organizations.

In 1989, Berwick wrote a seminal article for the New England Journal of Medicine called “Continuous Improvement as an Ideal in Health Care,” and set off an intellectual revolution in American, and eventually, global medicine. Prior to Berwick, “quality” had been linked with the word “assurance” with the cavalier and false assumption that quality already existed, and all that was needed was adequate policing to root out “bad apples.” Every hospital was required to have a “quality assurance” department that looked out for quality; everybody else just did their jobs.

More than anyone, Berwick changed the word from “assurance” to “improvement” with new assumptions: quality must be an essential part of everyone’s job; no matter how good or how bad you think you and your organization are, every day, you have multiple opportunities to improve; and the key to quality improvement (QI) is the elimination of errors and waste, along with the empowerment of workers. Berwick did more than just establish an idea, he created an organization, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement (IHI), to advance and actualize it. Under his leadership, IHI has become the worldwide home for QI through training, teaching, learning, collaborating, advocating, and more.

Berwick also ran into trouble for using the ‘r’ word.  Specifically, in an interview with a biotechnology journal in 2009, he said, “The decision is not whether or not we will ration care — the decision is whether we will ration with our eyes open.”

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Medicare’s push to evaluate all types of providers is being extended to Inpatient Rehabilitation Hospitals (IRFs).  According to Health Reform bill (specifically, Section 3004 of the Affordable Care Act), CMS is required to start publishing quality measures for IRFs by October 1, 2012. This newly created IRF Quality Reporting Program (QRP) currently has proposed two measures.  These include the following:

  • Presentation of Urinary Catheter-Associated Urinary Tract Infections (CAUTI)
  • Presentation of Percent of Residents with Pressure Ulcers that Are New or Have Worsened

CMS will hold an Open Door Forum on Tuesday, November 29, 2011, 2pm-4pm ET to discuss these measures.  It is disappointing that CMS only has two quality measures for the IRF program.  Thus, the QRP is far less comprehensive then Health Reform intendend.  Hopefully, the number of quality measures increases over time.  The Healthcare Economist does realize, however, that rehabilitation services are much harder to evaluate than more procedure based services with more observable outcomes.  Specifically, improvement in patient functioning is a key measure for IRFs.  However, if the IRFs themselves self-report this data, the quality measures will not be unbiased.  I am assuming that the data for the IRF QRP come from the IRF Patient Assessment Instrument (PAI), and thus the quality data will be self-reported by the IRFs themselves.  Here is the form used by IRFs as part of the PAI.

One problem with any quality system is cases where the provider fails to report the quality data.  In the QRP, however, IRFs will have a strong financial incentive to report these measures.  Specifically, if an IRF fails to report their quality measures, Medicare will reduce their payments by 2 percentage points.

 

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The Medicare billing system is complex.  There an alphabet soup of acronyms, (e.g., RVUs, CPT, HCPCS, GPCI) and each of these affects payments in different ways.  In addition to the standard payment terms, Medicare is also creating additional payment incentives.  These payment incentives fall into three broad categories:

  • Quality reporting
  • e-Prescribing (eRx)
  • Electronic Health Records (EHR)

CMS’s Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS) allows physicians to report the quality of care their patients receive. Physicians can report PQRS measures through claims, registries, or EHR systems.  To incentivize physician participation in the PQRS, CMS has adopted incentive payments.  In 2012-2014, Physicians who meet the PQRS participation requirements will receive a 0.5 percent payment bonus.  In 2015 through 2017, however, who do not submit a sufficient number of PQRS measures actually will receive a payment reduction.

In addition to the PQRS incentive, beginning 2012, Medicare eligible professionals who are not successful electronic prescribers under the eRx Incentive Program to a payment adjustment. This payment adjustment applies to all of the eligible professional’s Part B-covered professional services under the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (MPFS). From 2012 through 2014, the payment adjustment will increase with each new reporting period. Accordingly, for 2012, eligible professionals receiving a payment adjustment will be paid 1.0% less than the Medicare Physician Fee Schedule (MPFS) amount for that service. In 2013 and 2014, the payment adjustment increases to 1.5% and 2.0% respectively.

A table summarizing these incentive payments is below.

Year PQRS eRx
Incentive Payment MOC Incentive Sucessful
2011 1.0% 0.5% 1% N/A
2012 0.5% 0.5% 1% -1%
2013 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% -0.5%
2014 0.5% 0.5% N/A -2%
2015 -1.5% N/A N/A N/A
2016 -2.0% N/A N/A N/A
2017 -2.0% N/A N/A N/A

CMS also offers physicians incentive payments to adopt EHR.  Incentive payments can be as high as $18,000 per year or $44,000 over a five year period.

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In the 18th and early 19th centuries, physician home visits in the U.S. were very common.  In fact, the home was the primary place where medicine was practiced.  Because physician wages at this time were comparable to those of the average laborer, a market which forced physicians to internalize the time and transportation costs to visit physicians made sense.

As physician wages have grown over time, however, the home visit has made less economic sense.  Consider the table below.  Primary care physician median wages are five times as high as the typical earners wages.  If it takes 30 minutes for the physician to drive and set up his equipment for a home visit, the incremental cost for the typical physician visit would be about $40 compared to only a time cost of about $8 if the patient visited the doctor. Having physician assistants or nurses make a home visit would be relatively more economical, but still is not economically efficient given the current labor market.

Nevertheless, home visits may be making a comeback.

A number of physicians in Great Britain’s National Health Service already make home visits. Further, Health Reform (specifically Section 3024 of the Affordable Care Act) mandated the creation of the Independence at Home (IAH) Demonstration. The IAH demonstration will begin in January 2012. Do home visits make economic sense?

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